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The study of the physical layer has offered a new perspective to the problem of
communication security. This led to the development of a vast set of ideas and tech-
niques rooted in information theory which can be employed in practice to provide
unbreakable security. The information-theoretic approach relies mainly on the physi-
cal nature of the communication medium. In a wireless medium, the unique features
of the wireless communication channel, such as its fading and broadcast nature, can
be exploited to achieve higher secure information rates. In this dissertation, we study
the secure transmission problem in wireless channels from an information-theoretic
perspective.
We first consider the fading multiple access wiretap channel. We give two new
achievable schemes that use the time-varying (fading) nature of the channel to align
the interference from different users at the eavesdropper perfectly in a one-dimensional
space while creating a higher-dimensional space for the interfering signals at the
legitimate receiver hence allowing for better chance of recovery. While we achieve
this alignment through signal scaling at the transmitters in our first scheme (scaling
based alignment), we let nature provide this alignment through the ergodicity of the
channel coefficients in the second scheme (ergodic secret alignment). For each scheme,
we show that the achievable secrecy rates scale logarithmically with the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR).
Next, we study the security gains that can be achieved in a wireless network
by employing cooperation among the nodes which is possible due to the broadcast
nature of the wireless channel. We investigate the role of passive (also known as
deaf) cooperation in improving the achievable secrecy rates in a Gaussian multiple
relay network with an external eavesdropper. We distinguish between two modes of
deaf cooperation, namely, cooperative jamming (CJ) and noise forwarding (NF). We
derive the conditions in which each mode of deaf cooperation achieves secrecy rates
that are higher than the secrecy capacity of the original Gaussian wiretap channel.
As a result, we show that a deaf helper cannot be a useful cooperative jammer and
noise forwarder at the same time. We derive the optimal power control policy for
each mode. We consider the deaf helper selection problem where a fixed-size set of
deaf helpers (possibly operating in different modes) are to be selected from the set
of available relays so that the achievable secrecy rate is maximized. We propose a
simple and efficient suboptimal strategy for selection which is shown to be optimal
when only one helper is selected.
Furthermore, we study the role of a multi-antenna deaf helper. Unlike the single
antenna case, we show that, in general, it is useful to split the helper’s power between
cooperative jamming and noise forwarding. Hence, we propose a deaf cooperation
strategy for this model and derive its optimal power control policy. We also show,
for specific class of relay-eavesdropper channels, that a simple cooperative jamming
strategy yields a secrecy rate that approaches the secrecy capacity as the helper’s
power is increased.
Finally, we consider the role of active cooperation for secrecy in the multiple relay
networks. We propose several relaying strategies for secure communication and derive
the achievable secrecy rate for each strategy. In our strategies the relays decode the
source signal and then forward it to the destination either in a single-hop or a multi-
hop fashion. Each relay scales its transmitted signal in a way that ensures that signal
components from different relays are canceled out at the eavesdropper.
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Secure transmission of information over communication channels has become an im-
portant design criterion in almost every communication system nowadays. Modern
communication systems are designed and implemented with both reliability and secu-
rity of communication in mind. Consequently, the aspect of secure communications
has been subjected to careful theoretical study and investigation over the last few
decades. As cryptography provides us with efficient and practical solutions for the
security problem that are acceptable under reasonable conjectures within the frame-
work of the theory of computational complexity, the underlying physical model of
the communication process is not exploited in the cryptographic approach. On the
other hand, the study of the physical layer offers a new interesting set of ideas and
methods that takes into account the aspects of how communication takes place and
exploits them to achieve unconditional security. The theoretical framework of this
study is rooted in information theory and is referred to as information-theoretic se-
curity. Information-theoretic security not only provides us with fundamental limits
on secure information rates but it can also provide us with methods and techniques
to achieve or approach these limits.
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The first rigorous information-theoretic treatment of the security aspect of com-
munication was presented by Shannon [17] in 1949. In his model, a private, au-
thenticated, and error-free link is assumed to be available between the legitimate
communicating pair. This link is used by the communicating pair to agree on a key
which is later used by one of them to encrypt its confidential message to the other
on a public error-free channel where any transmission could be perfectly intercepted
by an eavesdropper with unbounded computational power. Shannon showed that, to
achieve perfect security in this model, the length of the key must be at least as long
as the length of the confidential message. Later, in 1975, Wyner was the first to in-
troduce the notion of information-theoretic security to channels with imperfections in
his seminal work [21]. In his model, which is known as the wiretap channel, the sender
and the receiver of the confidential message are connected by only one imperfect com-
munication channel which is wiretapped by a passive but informed eavesdropper with
unbounded computational power. Wyner showed that one can indeed exploit the
channel randomness to pay for the extra randomness required to encrypt the message
and achieve secure communication without the help of a private channel between the
legitimate pair. In particular, Wyner introduced a measure for security called the
equivocation which is defined as the conditional entropy of the message given the
eavesdropper’s observation normalized by the length of the transmission duration.
Accordingly, for an information rate to be secure, the normalized mutual information
between the message and the eavesdropper’s observation must go to zero as the length
of the transmission duration goes to infinity. Wyner obtained an expression for the
supremum of the set of achievable secure information rates, i.e., the secrecy capacity
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of the wiretap channel. However, in Wyner’s model it was assumed that the received
signal by the eavesdropper is a degraded version of the signal received by the legiti-
mate receiver. This constraint was later removed by Csiszar and Korner in [4] where
they obtained the secrecy capacity in the general case. For a model well-suited to the
wireless channels, Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman obtained the secrecy capacity of
the Gaussian wiretap channel in [13].
Starting from Wyner’s work, the basic underlying idea of these works is that it is
possible to exploit the characteristics of the communication channel which are dictated
by the channel’s conditional probability distribution to achieve information-theoretic
security. When communication takes place in a wireless medium, the properties of the
wireless channel, such as its fading and broadcast nature, can be effectively utilized to
attain high secure rates. For example, fading can help improve the achievable secrecy
rates if the sender knows the channel state information (CSI), by utilizing the varying
nature of the fading wireless channel and by adjusting its transmit power so that more
information is communicated when the channel condition of the legitimate receiver
is better than that of the eavesdropper. In a multi-user fading wireless channel, one
can take advantage of the fading phenomenon to align the interference from different
users favorably at the legitimate receiver and unfavorably at the eavesdropper and
hence increase the achievable secrecy rates. On the other hand, the broadcast nature
of the wireless channel gives rise to two relevant concepts, namely, interference and
cooperation. These two concepts are shown to be useful in the context of secure com-
munication. In particular, in a cooperative wireless channel, a trusted node can help
increase the secure communication rate of the legitimate pair either by introducing a
3
useful interference to confuse the eavesdropper and hence limit its ability to obtain
any information about the transmitted message, i.e., by passive (deaf) cooperation,
or by listening to the sender’s transmission and accordingly helping communicate the
sender’s message to the receiver, i.e., by active cooperation.
In this dissertation, we study the ideas of alignment and cooperation in wireless
multi-user channels through the study of two different channel models, namely, the
fading multiple access wiretap (MAC-WT) channel and the relay-eavesdropper chan-
nel. We introduce new schemes to achieve high secure rates in these channel models.
Our work reveals several interesting aspects about the incorporation of these no-
tions into the multi-user channels and proposes efficient techniques that utilize these
aspects to boost communication security in terms of the achievable secure rates. In-
terestingly, the work in this dissertation shows that schemes that were not useful
when the secrecy constraint is not imposed may be very useful in the secrecy context.
Our motivation is to show the role of the physical layer in providing and im-
proving security of communication in these aforementioned channel models from an
information-theoretic perspective through the efficient use of the notions of alignment
and cooperation. Although the results we obtain are theoretical in nature, several
practical considerations of the proposed schemes are studied to provide useful insights
on the security gains attainable by these schemes when used in practice. In the models
studied in this dissertation, we assume that the eavesdropper’s perfect channel state
information is available at all the nodes in a causal fashion which, despite of being a
standard assumption in many related works in this area, is not a practical assumption.
However, the problem of providing information-theoretic security in wireless channel
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models where nothing is known about the eavesdropper’s channel state information
is a challenging task and is still being investigated in current research in this area.
The MAC-WT channel was introduced in [19]. References [19] and [20] focus on
the Gaussian MAC-WT, and provide achievable schemes based on i.i.d. Gaussian
signaling. Reference [20] goes further than plain Gaussian signaling and introduces a
technique that uses the power of a non-transmitting node in jamming the eavesdrop-
per with i.i.d. Gaussian noise. This technique is referred to as Gaussian signaling
based cooperative jamming (from this point on, we will refer to this technique as
simply cooperative jamming, or CJ). A notable shortcoming of these i.i.d. Gaussian
signaling based achievable schemes is that rates obtained using them do not scale with
the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Hence, the number of Degrees of Freedom (DoF) for
the MAC-WT achieved using these schemes is zero. On the other hand, the results
on the secure DoF of Gaussian interference networks in [12], [7], [9], [8], and [2], sug-
gested that these schemes may be suboptimal. Fading Gaussian MAC-WT was first
considered in [18] where, as in the non-fading case, the achievable ergodic secrecy
rates obtained through i.i.d. Gaussian signaling do not scale with SNR.
In Chapter 2, we use the idea of interference alignment to introduce two new
achievable schemes for secrecy in the fading MAC-WT. We derive the ergodic secrecy
rates achievable by these schemes and show that, in the K-user fading MAC-WT
channel, the users’ sum rate achieved by each of the two schemes scales with SNR
as K−1
K
log (SNR). Our first achievable scheme, the scaling based alignment (SBA)
scheme, is based on code repetition with proper scaling of the transmitted signals.
Transmitters scale their transmit signals such that over K consecutive time instants
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the equivalent channel matrix at the legitimate receiver is of full-rank whereas the
equivalent channel matrix at the eavesdropper is of unit-rank. In our second achiev-
able scheme, the ergodic secret alignment (ESA) scheme, we extend the idea of ergodic
interference alignment in [14] to the secrecy context. In the ESA scheme, we care-
fully choose the time instants over which codeword symbols are repeated such that
the received signals are aligned favorably at the legitimate receiver while they are
aligned unfavorably at the eavesdropper. We also introduce an improved version of
our second scheme in which we use cooperative jamming on top of the ESA scheme
to obtain larger secrecy rates. Moreover, we obtain a power allocation policy that
satisfies the necessary KKT conditions of optimality.
Next, we focus on the security problem in cooperative wireless channels. In Chap-
ters 3 and 4, we study the concept of deaf cooperation to reinforce security of trans-
mission over the Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channels. We distinguish between two
main schemes of deaf cooperation based on Gaussian signaling, namely, the coopera-
tive jamming (CJ) scheme and the noise forwarding (NF) scheme. In the CJ scheme,
a helping interferer transmits white Gaussian noise when it can hurt the eavesdropper
more than it can hurt the legitimate receiver and hence improve the achievable se-
crecy rate. The idea of introducing artificial noise in a GWT channel by a helper node
was introduced in [31], [34], [19], [20]. In relay networks with secrecy constraints, the
role of CJ was further investigated, e.g., in [27], [22], and [36]. References [23], [26],
and [25] proposed CJ strategies for multiple-antenna relay networks. On the other
hand, in the NF scheme which was introduced in [29], the relay node sends a dummy
(context-free) codeword drawn at random from a codebook that is known to both the
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legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper to introduce helpful interference that would
hurt the eavesdropper more than the legitimate receiver.
In Chapter 3, we investigate the role of a deaf helper in improving the achievable
secrecy rates of a Gaussian wiretap channel (GWT) by using either the CJ mode
or the NF mode of deaf cooperation. We derive the conditions under which each
mode of deaf cooperation improves over the secrecy capacity of the original wiretap
channel and show that a helping node can be either a useful cooperative jammer or a
useful noise forwarder but not both at the same time. We derive the optimal power
allocation for both the source and the helping node to be used in each of the two
modes of deaf helping. Then, we consider the deaf helper selection problem where
there are N relays present in the system and it is required to select the best K deaf
helpers, K ≥ 1, that yield the maximum possible achievable secrecy rate with deaf
cooperation using K relays. We give an optimal strategy for the case of K = 1, i.e.,
for the selection of a single deaf helper. The computational complexity of the optimal
selection for the general case when K > 1 is prohibitive. We propose a suboptimal
strategy for the selection problem in the general case. We discuss the complexity of
the proposed single and multiple relay selection strategies and show that both of them
are efficient, and verify the performance of the proposed strategies through numerical
examples.
In Chapter 4, we study the CJ and the NF modes of deaf cooperation when the
helper node is equipped with multiple antennas. We decompose the channel from
the helper to the eavesdropper into two orthogonal components: one is aligned in
the direction of the channel between the helper and the legitimate receiver (direct
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component) and the other is in the orthogonal direction to the channel between the
helper and the legitimate receiver (orthogonal component). We then propose a strat-
egy in which the helper uses the orthogonal component to transmit pure Gaussian
noise as in the CJ strategy while it uses the direct component for either CJ or NF
depending on the given channel conditions. We explicitly derive the optimal power
control policy for this strategy and give the achievable secrecy rates when the direct
component is used to perform CJ or NF. We hence derive the channel conditions
where CJ is better than NF over the direct component and vice versa. Next, we con-
sider the reversely degraded multiple-antenna relay-eavesdropper channel. We show
that a simple strategy in which the relay jams with full power along the orthogonal
component and transmits nothing in the direct component achieves a secrecy rate
that approaches the secrecy capacity of this channel as the relay’s average power goes
to infinity. Moreover, we show that this result is valid with probability 1 even if the
relay-eavesdropper’s channel state information is unavailable.
Finally, we turn our attention to the role of active cooperation for secrecy in wire-
less relay networks. In active cooperation, the relay listens to the source transmissions
and uses its observation to improve the achievable secrecy rate. This mode is based
on the well-known strategies, e.g., decode-and-forward (DF), compress-and-forward
(CF), and amplify-and-forward (AF) strategies, devised originally for the coopera-
tive models with no secrecy constraint. These strategies were first introduced in [38]
for the single relay channel with no secrecy constraints. In the context of multi-
ple relay networks with no secrecy constraints, [41] and [40] proposed multi-hop DF
strategies and obtained the achievable rates by these strategies. In [29], the single
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relay-eavesdropper channel was introduced and achievable secrecy rates were obtained
based on extended versions of these strategies. We focus in this dissertation on the
DF-based strategies. In [39] and [43], two-stage (half-duplex) cooperative secrecy
protocols were proposed in which a set of multiple relays decode the source’s message
in the first stage, then the relays forward the source’s message to the destination
using beamforming. Both references investigated the role of the beamforming relays
in improving secrecy.
In Chapter 5, we investigate full-duplex relaying strategies for secrecy in coop-
erative relay networks. We first study the DF strategy for secrecy in a single relay
channel with an eavesdropper. We propose a suboptimal decode-and-forward with
zero-forcing (DF/ZF) strategy for which we obtain the optimal power control policy.
Next, we consider the multiple relays problem. We propose three strategies based on
the DF/ZF technique. In the first strategy, all the relays decode the source message
at the same time, and then perform beamforming. We give the achievable rate by this
strategy and derive the optimal power control policy. We show that in this strategy
the relays which are far from the source create a bottleneck and limit the achievable
rate. In the second strategy, the relays are ordered with respect to their distance
from the source and they perform decode-and-forward in a multi-hop fashion. We
derive the achievable rate by this strategy and show that it overcomes the drawback
of the first strategy. We discuss the zero-forcing technique in the second strategy and
show that only half of the relays’ signals can be eliminated from the eavesdropper’s
observation. Hence, we propose a third strategy which is also a multi-hop decode-
and-forward strategy, however the number of hops is half of that required by the
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second strategy. We show that in the third strategy, it is possible to fully eliminate
all the relays’s signals from the eavesdropper’s observation. Finally, we give numerical






The multiple access wiretap channel (MAC-WT) was introduced in [19]. In MAC-
WT, multiple users wish to have secure communication with a single receiver, in the
presence of a passive eavesdropper. The Gaussian MAC-WT was studied in [19] and
[20]. In both references, achievable schemes based on Gaussian signaling (i.e., using
i.i.d. Gaussian codebooks) were provided. In addition to achievable schemes based
on plain Gaussian signaling, [20] introduces a scheme that can be used in conjunction
with Gaussian signaling to improve the achievable secrecy rates. In this scheme, a
node that does not transmit information uses its power to jam the eavesdropper.
This technique is called cooperative jamming (CJ). Cooperative jamming is indeed a
channel prefixing technique where specific choices are made for the auxiliary random
variables [5]. In addition, cooperative jamming is the first significant application
of channel prefixing in a multi-user Gaussian wiretap channel that improves over
plain Gaussian signaling. More recently, reference [6] showed that for a certain class
of Gaussian MAC-WT, one can achieve through Gaussian signaling a secrecy rate
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region that is within 0.5 bits of the secrecy capacity region. Consequently, there has
been some expectation that secrecy capacity may be obtained for Gaussian MAC-WT
through i.i.d. Gaussian signaling, potentially with Gaussian channel prefixing.
However, a notable shortcoming of these Gaussian signaling based achievable
schemes is that rates obtained using them do not scale with the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR). In other words, the schemes achieve zero Degrees of Freedom (DoF) in the
MAC-WT. This observation led to the belief that these schemes, and hence Gaus-
sian signaling (with or without channel prefixing), may be suboptimal. This belief is
made certain as a direct consequence of the results on the secure DoF of Gaussian
interference networks that were obtained in several papers, e.g., in [12], [7], [9], [8],
and [2]. The schemes in each of [12] and [7] mainly relied on the interference align-
ment technique proposed by Cadambe and Jafar for the K-user interference channel
in their pioneering work [3]. In the original interference alignment technique, the
input data stream from each user is mapped using a precoding matrix to a longer
sequence (almost twice the original length in the asymptotic sense) and then sent
over the channel. Hence, the observed signal space at each receiver is of almost twice
the size (i.e., dimensionality) of the space of the original data. By carefully designing
the precoding matrices at the transmitters, the observed signal space at each receiver
could be partitioned into two almost equal subspaces, one of which is meant for the
desired signal and the other acts as a waste basket for the interfering signals from
other users. Consequently, it was shown that one can achieve 1
2
DoF per user in the
K-user interference channel using this technique. Inspired by this technique in the
secrecy context, it was shown in [12] and [7] that positive secure DoF is achievable
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for a class of vector Gaussian interference channels. In fact, this result is also valid
for time-varying channels with only causal knowledge of channel state information
which in turn implies that positive secure DoF is achievable for the vector Gaussian
MAC-WT in general. In [9] and [8], it was shown that through structured coding
(e.g., lattice coding), it is possible to achieve positive DoF for a class of scalar (i.e.,
non-time-varying) Gaussian channels with interference that contains the Gaussian
MAC-WT. More recently, in [2], both the Gaussian multiple input multiple output
(MIMO) MAC-WT and the Gaussian scalar MAC-WT were considered. For the K-
user Gaussian MIMO MAC-WT model, [2] provides an algorithm which is inspired by
the original interference alignment technique [3] to separate the received signals at the
legitimate receiver and at the same time align them in a low-dimensional subspace
in the signal space observed by the eavesdropper. For the K-user Gaussian scalar
MAC-WT, [2] proposes an achievable secure coding scheme to achieve positive secure
DoF. Namely, the proposed scheme achieves total secure DoF of K−1
K
for almost all
channel gains. This is done by incorporating the new alignment technique known as
real interference alignment that was first proposed in [1] that performs on a single real
line and exploits the properties of real numbers to align interference in time-invariant
channels.
Fading Gaussian MAC-WT was first considered in [18] where the Gaussian signal-
ing and cooperative jamming schemes which were originally proposed in [19] and [20]
are extended to the fading MAC-WT. Using these schemes, [18] gave achievable er-
godic sum secrecy rates for the fading MAC-WT. Similar to the non-fading setting,
these achievable ergodic secrecy rates do not scale with the average SNRs. In this
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chapter, we propose two new achievable schemes for the fading Gaussian MAC-WT.
Our first achievable scheme, the scaling based alignment (SBA) scheme, is based on
code repetition with proper scaling of transmitted signals. We first consider the two-
user fading MAC-WT. The generalization of this scheme to the case of more than
two users is presented subsequently. In particular, for the two-user fading MAC-WT,
transmitters repeat their symbols in two consecutive symbol instants. Transmitters
further scale their transmit signals with the goal of creating a full-rank channel matrix
at the main receiver and a unit-rank channel matrix at the eavesdropper, in every two
consecutive time instants. These coordinated actions create a two-dimensional space
for the signal received by the legitimate receiver, while sustaining the interference in
a single-dimensional space at the eavesdropper. In other words, code repetition with
proper scaling of the transmit signals at each transmitter aligns the received signals
at the eavesdropper perfectly making it difficult for the eavesdropper to decode both
messages. Consequently, we obtain a new achievable secrecy rate region for the two-
user fading MAC-WT. In fact, it might be useful here to compare our SBA scheme
with the technique used in [2] for the Gaussian MIMO MAC-WT. In the model con-
sidered here, we could create parallel MAC channels to each of the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper by symbol repetition and exploiting the time-varying nature
of fading channels and hence by proper scaling (precoding), one can almost surely
create a full-dimensional space for the received signal at the legitimate receiver and
one-dimensional space for the received signal at the eavesdropper. On the other hand,
in [2], the existence of multiple spatial dimensions is already imposed by the model
itself (Gaussian MIMO MAC-WT) and hence the precoding technique used in [2] for
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this model achieves secure DoF that eventually depends on the channel gain matrices
from the transmitters to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper.
In another recent work [14], it was shown that in a fading interference channel,
by code repetition over properly chosen time instants, one can perfectly cancel in-
terference at each receiver so that the resulting individual rates scale as 1
2
log(SNR).
Thus, the rate reduction by a factor of 1
2
comes with the benefit of perfect inter-
ference cancellation. In this chapter, we extend the ergodic interference alignment
concept to a secrecy context and we propose another achievable scheme which we call
ergodic secret alignment (ESA). We first consider the two-user fading MAC-WT, and
generalize this scheme to the case of more than two users subsequently. In the SBA
scheme, code repetition is done over two consecutive time instants, while in the ESA
scheme, we carefully choose the time instants over which we do code repetition such
that the received signals are aligned favorably at the legitimate receiver while they are
aligned unfavorably at the eavesdropper. In particular, given some time instant with
the vector of the main receiver channel coefficients and the vector of the eavesdropper
channel coefficients given by h = [h1 h2]
T and g = [g1 g2]
T , respectively, if X1 and
X2 are the symbols transmitted in this time instant by users 1 and 2, respectively,
our objective, roughly speaking, is to determine the channel gains we should wait
for to transmit X1 and X2 again. In this chapter, we show that, in order to maxi-
mize achievable secrecy rates, we should wait for a time instant in which the main
receiver channel coefficients are [h1 − h2]T and the eavesdropper channel coefficients
are [g1 g2]
T . Consequently, we obtain another achievable secrecy rate region for the
two-user fading MAC-WT.
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For both proposed schemes, we show that the resulting secrecy rates scale with
SNR. Specifically, the achievable secrecy sum rate scales as 1
2
log(SNR). Moreover,
we show that the secrecy rates achieved through i.i.d. Gaussian signaling with coop-
erative jamming in fading MAC-WT do not scale with SNR. The significance of these
results is that, they show that indeed neither plain i.i.d. Gaussian signaling nor i.i.d.
Gaussian signaling with cooperative jamming is optimal for the fading MAC-WT,
and that, for high SNRs, one can achieve higher secrecy rates by aligning interference
perfectly in the eavesdropper MAC while reducing, or cancelling, interference at the
main receiver MAC using some coordinated actions at both transmitters that involve
code repetition, i.e., a form of time-correlated (non i.i.d.) signaling.
In fact, the achievable rate region using the second scheme, the ESA scheme,
involves two significant improvements over the one achieved by the SBA scheme when
the channel coefficients are circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables.
First, the expressions for achievable rates by the SBA scheme involve products of
the squared magnitudes of the channel coefficients. The squared magnitudes of the
channel coefficients are exponential random variables and hence multiplying them
together gives a random variable that takes small values with higher probability than
the original exponential random variables would take these values. This in effect
reduces the achievable rates by the SBA scheme. On the other hand, the achievable
secrecy rates by the ESA scheme do not have this drawback. In other words, by code
repetition, the SBA scheme creates two (not perfectly) correlated MAC channels to
the main receiver and two perfectly correlated MAC channels to the eavesdropper,
while the ESA scheme creates an orthogonal MAC channel to the main receiver
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and two perfectly correlated MAC channels to the eavesdropper. This fact leads to
higher achievable secrecy rates by the ESA scheme. The second improvement of the
ESA scheme with respect to the SBA scheme is that the average power constraints
associated with the ESA scheme do not involve any channel coefficients whereas those
associated with the SBA scheme involve the gains of the eavesdropper channel which
in turn result in inefficient use of transmit powers. However, it is noteworthy that
SBA scheme holds one practical advantage over the ESA scheme that actually does
not appear in the achievable rates by the two schemes. Namely, in the SBA scheme,
we do not wait for favorable channel conditions for alignment since repetition is done
over consecutive time slots. On the other hand, in the ESA scheme, one should wait
for the proper channel conditions before repetition takes place. The waiting time
required to match up the channel states is an important performance factor for the
ESA scheme in practice.
In addition, we introduce an improved version of our second scheme in which we
use cooperative jamming on top of the ESA scheme to achieve higher secrecy rates.
Moreover, since the rate expressions achieved by the ESA scheme (with and with-
out cooperative jamming) and their associated average power constraints are simpler
than their counterparts in the SBA scheme, we derive the necessary conditions on the
optimal power allocations that maximize the sum secrecy rate achieved by the ESA
scheme when used alone and when used together with cooperative jamming. Since
the achievable secrecy sum rate, in general, is not a concave function in the power al-
location policy, the solution of such optimization problem may not be unique. Hence,
we obtain a power allocation policy that satisfies the necessary (but not necessarily
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sufficient) KKT conditions of optimality.
We provide numerical examples that illustrate the scaling of the sum rates achieved
by the proposed schemes with SNR and the saturation of the secrecy sum rate achieved
by the i.i.d. Gaussian signaling scheme with cooperative jamming. We also give
numerical examples for the secrecy sum rates achieved by the ESA scheme with and
without cooperative jamming when power control is used.
Finally, we discuss the extension of the SBA and the ESA schemes to the case of
K-user fading MAC-WT channel for K ≥ 2. We show that each of the two schemes
achieves a total of K−1
K
secure DoF which is the same total secure DoF shown in [2] to
be achievable for the K-user Gaussian scalar MAC-WT for almost all channel gains
using the real interference alignment technique.
2.2 System Model
We consider the two-user fading multiple access channel with an external eavesdrop-
per. Transmitter k chooses a message Wk from a set of equally likely messages
Wk = {1, ..., 22nRk}, k = 1, 2. Every transmitter encodes its message into a code-
word of length 2n symbols. The channel output at the intended receiver and the
eavesdropper at the symbol interval t are given by
Yt =h1tX1t + h2tX2t +Nt (2.1)




where, for k = 1, 2, Xkt is the input signal at transmitter k at channel use t, hkt, gkt
are the channel coefficients at channel use t between transmitter k and the intended
receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. We assume a fast fading scenario where
the channel coefficients randomly vary from one symbol to another in i.i.d. fashion.
Also, we assume the independence of all channel coefficients hkt and gkt for all k, t.
Each of the channel coefficients is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random
variable with zero-mean. The variances of hkt and gkt are σ
2
hk
and σ2gk , respectively
for all t. Hence, |hkt|2 and |gkt|2 are exponentially distributed random variables with
mean σ2hk and σ
2
gk
, respectively. Moreover, we assume that all the channel coefficients
are known to all the nodes in a causal fashion. In (2.1)-(2.2), Nt and N
′
t are the inde-
pendent Gaussian noises at the intended receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively,
and are i.i.d. (in time) circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with
zero-mean and unit-variance. For the rest of the chapter, we will drop the time index
t for notational convenience unless it is clearly stated otherwise. We have the usual
average power constraints
E[|Xk|2] ≤ P̄k, k = 1, 2. (2.3)
A (22nR1 , 22nR2 , 2n) code for this channel consists of two stochastic encoders ϕk, k =
1, 2 at the transmitters where ϕk maps a message Wk ∈ Wk to a sequence of complex
numbers X2nk , and a decoder ψ at the main receiver which maps the received sequence








estimate of the message pair (Ŵ1, Ŵ2) ∈ W1 ×W2. The probability of error is
P 2ne = Pr
(
(Ŵ1, Ŵ2) 6= (W1,W2)
)
(2.4)
A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable with perfect secrecy if there is a
(22nR1 , 22nR2 , 2n) code satisfying
lim
n→∞







2n|h2n1 , h2n2 , g2n1 , g2n2
)
= 0 (2.5)
2.3 Previously Known Results
Here we summarize previously known results that are relevant to our development.
For the general discrete-time memoryless MAC-WT, the best known achievable se-
crecy rate region [19], [20], [5] is given by the convex hull of all rate pairs (R1, R2)
satisfying
R1 ≤ I(V1;Y |V2)− I(V1;Z) (2.6)
R2 ≤ I(V2;Y |V1)− I(V2;Z) (2.7)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(V1, V2;Y )− I(V1, V2;Z) (2.8)
where the distribution p(x1, x2, v1, v2, y, z) factors as p(v1)p(x1|v1)p(v2)p(x2|v2)
p(y, z|x1, x2).
Known secrecy rate regions for the Gaussian MAC-WT can be obtained from
these expressions by appropriate selections for the involved random variables. For
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instance, the Gaussian signaling based achievable rates proposed in [19] are obtained
by choosing X1 = V1 and X2 = V2, i.e., no channel prefixing, and by choosing X1
and X2 to be Gaussian with full power. On the other hand, cooperative jamming
based achievable rates proposed in [20] are obtained by choosing X1 = V1 + T1 and
X2 = V2+T2, and then by choosing V1, V2, T1, T2 to be independent Gaussian random
variables [5]. Namely, for k = 1, 2, Vk and Tk are Gaussian random variables with
zero mean and variances Pk and Qk, respectively. Here, V1 and V2 carry messages,
while T1 and T2 are jamming signals. The powers of (V1, T1) and (V2, T2) should be
chosen to satisfy the power constraints of users 1 and 2, respectively. These selections
























1 + |g1|2(P1 +Q1) + |g2|2Q2
)
(2.10)










1 + |g1|2Q1 + |g2|2Q2
)
(2.11)
where the powers of the signals must satisfy
Pk +Qk ≤ P̄k, k = 1, 2 (2.12)
where Pk and Qk are the transmission and jamming powers, respectively, of user k.
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The ergodic secrecy rate region achieved by Gaussian signaling and cooperative
jamming for the fading MAC-WT can be expressed similarly by simply including




























1 + |g1|2(P1 +Q1) + |g2|2Q2
)}
(2.14)












1 + |g1|2Q1 + |g2|2Q2
)}
(2.15)
where h = [h1 h2]
T , g = [g1 g2]
T , and the instantaneous powers Pk and Qk, which are
both functions of h and g, satisfy
E [Pk +Qk] ≤ P̄k, k = 1, 2 (2.16)
2.4 Scaling Based Alignment (SBA)
In this section, we introduce a new achievable scheme for the fading MAC-WT. Our
achievable scheme is based on code repetition with proper scaling of the signals trans-
mitted by each transmitter. This is done as follows. For the channel described in
(2.1)-(2.2), we use a repetition code such that each transmitter repeats its channel
input symbol twice over two consecutive time instants. Due to code repetition, we
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may regard each of the MACs to the main receiver and to the eavesdropper as a
vector MAC composed of two parallel scalar MACs, one for the odd time instants
and the other for the even time instants. Consequently, we may describe the main
receiver MAC channel by the following pair of equations
Yo = h1oX1 + h2oX2 +No (2.17)
Ye = h1eX1 + h2eX2 +Ne (2.18)
where, for k = 1, 2, hko, hke are the coefficients of the kth main receiver channel in
odd and even time instants, Yo, Ye and No, Ne are the received signal and the noise at
the main receiver in odd and even time instants. In the same way, we may describe
the eavesdropper MAC channel by the following pair of equations
Zo = g1oX1 + g2oX2 +N
′
o (2.19)
Ze = g1eX1 + g2eX2 +N
′
e (2.20)
where, for k = 1, 2, gko, gke are the coefficients of the kth eavesdropper channel in odd
and even time instants, Zo, Ze and No, Ne are the received signal and the noise at the
eavesdropper in odd and even time instants.
Since all the channel gains are known to all nodes in a causal fashion, the two
transmitters use this knowledge as follows. In every symbol instant, each transmitter
scales its transmit signal with the gain of the other transmitter’s channel to the
eavesdropper. That is, in every symbol duration, the first user multiplies its channel
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input with g2, the channel gain of the second user to the eavesdropper, and the
second user multiplies its channel input with g1, the channel gain of the first user to
the eavesdropper. Hence the main receiver MAC can be described as
Yo = h1og2oX1 + h2og1oX2 +No (2.21)
Ye = h1eg2eX1 + h2eg1eX2 +Ne (2.22)
and the eavesdropper MAC can be described as
Zo = g1og2oX1 + g1og2oX2 +N
′
o (2.23)
Ze = g1eg2eX1 + g1eg2eX2 +N
′
e (2.24)
It is clear from (2.21)-(2.22) that the space of the received signal (without noise,
i.e., high SNR) of the main receiver over the two consecutive time instants is two-
dimensional almost surely. In other words, the channel matrix of the main receiver
vector MAC is full-rank almost surely. This is due to the fact that the channel
coefficients are drawn from continuous bounded distributions. On the other hand, it
is clear from (2.23)-(2.24) that the channel matrix of the eavesdropper vector MAC is
unit-rank. That is, the two ingredients of our scheme, i.e., code repetition and signal
scaling, let the interfering signals at the main receiver live in a two-dimensional space,
while they align the interfering signals at the eavesdropper in a one-dimensional space.
As we will show in the Section 2.6, these properties play a central role in achieving
secrecy rates that scale with SNR.
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Let ho = (h1o, h2o) and he = (h1e, h2e). We define go and ge in the same way.
For k = 1, 2, we define the power allocation policy of transmitter k as a mapping
Pk : C
4 → R+ which maps (ho,go) to a non-negative real number Pk (ho,go) which
is the power of transmitter k in the odd time slot for which the values of channel
gains are (ho,go). Note that due to symbol repetition, Pk is a function of (ho,go)
only and does not depend on (he,ge). To simplify notation, we will use Pk to denote
Pk (ho,go) since this dependency on channel gains is implicitly understood. We note















Now, we evaluate the secrecy rate region achievable by our scaling based align-
ment (SBA) scheme. Given the vector channels (2.21)-(2.22) and (2.23)-(2.24), the












[I(X1, X2;Yo, Ye|h,g)− I(X1, X2;Zo, Ze|h,g)] (2.29)
where h = (ho,he) and g = (go,ge). These expressions for achievable rates follow
from (2.6)-(2.8) by treating channel states as outputs at the receivers, and noting the




the right hand sides of (2.27)-(2.29) is due to repetition coding. Now, by computing
(2.27)-(2.29) with Gaussian signals, we obtain the secrecy rate region given in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2.1 For the two-user fading MAC-WT, the rate region given by all rate













































































where P̄1 and P̄2 are the average power constraints.
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2.5 Ergodic Secret Alignment (ESA)
After we have devised the scaling based alignment scheme, the ergodic interference
alignment scheme of Nazer et. al. [14] inspired us to propose an improved achievable
scheme. In this section, we discuss this scheme which we call ergodic secret alignment
(ESA). The new ingredient in this scheme is to perform repetition coding at two
carefully chosen time instances as opposed to two consecutive time instances as we
have done in Section 2.4.
For the MAC-WT described by (2.1)-(2.2), we use a repetition code in a way
similar to the one in [14]. The simple idea of the scheme is that we repeat each code
symbol in the time instant that holds certain channel conditions relative to the those
conditions in the time instant where this code symbol is first transmitted. Namely,
given a time instant with the main receiver channel state vector h = [h1 h2]
T and
the eavesdropper channel state vector g = [g1 g2]
T , where the symbols X1 and X2
are first transmitted by the two transmitters, we will solve for the channel states
h̃ = [h̃1 h̃2]
T and g̃ = [g̃1 g̃2]
T , where these symbols should be repeated again, such
that the resulting secrecy rates achieved by Gaussian signaling are maximized.
The above description is an intuitive description that gives the idea of the scheme
which is based on the concept of ergodic interference alignment introduced in [14]. A
rigorous description and proof follow the arguments in [14]. In particular, the idea of
the proof [14] is first to quantize the channel coefficients and deal with the quantized
coefficients rather than dealing with the original coefficients defined over the whole
complex plane. Then, one can show that those quantized channel coefficients of
27
the same type (distribution) could be paired with another set of quantized channel
coefficients of a symmetric type. Consequently, one can derive the achievable rate
when such pairing between symmetric types is employed. Finally, using the continuity
of the achievable rate as a function in channel coefficients, one can argue that by
decreasing the quantization bin size, one can approach the desired rate for the original
channel (with complex coefficients) in the limit. The detailed proof is found in [14].
Due to code repetition, we may regard each of the MACs to the main receiver and
to the eavesdropper as a vector MAC composed of two parallel scalar MACs, one for
each one of the two time instants over which the same code symbols X1 and X2 are
transmitted. Consequently, we may describe the main receiver MAC channel by the
following pair of equations
Y1 = h1X1 + h2X2 +N1 (2.35)
Y2 = h̃1X1 + h̃2X2 +N2 (2.36)
where Y1, Y2 and N1, N2 are the received symbols and the noise at the main receiver
in the two time instants of code repetition. In the same way, we may describe the
eavesdropper MAC channel by the following pair of equations
Z1 = g1X1 + g2X2 +N
′
1 (2.37)
Z2 = g̃1X1 + g̃2X2 +N
′
2 (2.38)




2 are the received symbols and the noise at the eavesdropper in
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the two time instants of code repetition. For k = 1, 2, we define the power allocation
policy Pk of transmitter k in a way similar to the way it was defined in the SBA
scheme. Namely, it is defined as a mapping Pk : C
4 → R+ which maps the values of
the channel gains (h,g) to a non-negative real number Pk (h,g) which is the power
of transmitter k when the channel gains take the values (h,g). Again, to simplify
notation, we will use Pk to denote Pk (h,g) since this dependency on channel gains
is implicitly understood.
In the next theorem, we give another achievable secrecy rate region for the two-user
fading MAC-WT. The achievable region is obtained using (2.27)-(2.29) and replacing
(Yo, Ye) and (Zo, Ze) with (Y1, Y2) and (Z1, Z2), respectively, and evaluating these
expressions with Gaussian signals, and by choosing optimal h̃ = (h̃1, h̃2) and g̃ =
(g̃1, g̃2) to maximize the achievable rates. As we will show shortly as a result of
Theorem 2.2, the optimal selection of h̃ and g̃ will yield an orthogonal MAC to the
main receiver and a scalar MAC to the eavesdropper. In writing the achievable rate
expressions, we will again account for code repetition by multiplying achievable rates
by a factor of 1
2
.
Theorem 2.2 For the two-user fading MAC-WT, the rate region given by all rate
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where P1 and P2 are the power allocation policies of users 1 and 2, respectively, and
are both functions of h and g in general (as defined above). In addition, they satisfy
the average power constraints
E[P1] ≤ P̄1 (2.42)
E[P2] ≤ P̄2 (2.43)
Proof: First, consider the two vector MACs given by (2.35)-(2.38). Observe that as
in [14], h̃ must be chosen such that it has the same distribution as h and g̃ must
be chosen such that it has the same distribution as g. The reason for this can be
understood from the idea of the proof in [14] discussed earlier in this section. Indeed,
in the quantized channel, in order for the pairing between channel coefficients at two
different instants to be possible, the values of the channel coefficients at the two time
instants must occur with the same probability. That is why we require that h̃ and g̃
to have the same distributions as h and g, respectively. Now, since h ∼ CN (0,Bh)
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and g ∼ CN (0,Bg) where Bh = diag(σ2h1 , σ2h2) and Bg = diag(σ2g1 , σ2g2), then in
order to achieve the requirement above, it follows from the symmetry property of the
complex Gaussian distribution that the channel realizations h and g must be paired
with the channel realizations h̃ and g̃, respectively, that are related as h̃ = Uh
and g̃ = Vg for some unitary matrices U and V (rotations in C2). Furthermore,




) and of g (i.e., σ2g1 , σ
2
g2
), we must have U = diag(exp(jθ1), exp(jθ2)) and
V = diag(exp(jω1), exp(jω2)) for some θ1, θ2, ω1, ω2 ∈ [0, 2π). Then, it follows that
(2.35)-(2.38) can be written as












Using (2.27)-(2.29) and replacing (Yo, Ye) and (Zo, Ze) with (Y1, Y2) and (Z1, Z2),
31






































log(1 + 2|h1|2P1 + 2|h2|2P2 + 2(1− cos(θ))|h1|2|h2|2P1P2)
− log(1 + 2|g1|2P1 + 2|g2|2P2 + 2(1− cos(ω))|g1|2|g2|2P1P2)
}
(2.50)
where θ = θ2 − θ1 and ω = ω2 − ω1.
Hence, the largest achievable secrecy rate region (2.48)-(2.50) is attained by choos-
ing θ = π and ω = 0. This can be achieved by choosing θ1 = 0 and θ2 = π and by
choosing ω1 = ω2 = 0. Consequently, we have h̃ = [h1 − h2]T and g̃ = [g1 g2]T . By
substituting these values of θ and ω in (2.48)-(2.50), we obtain the region given by
(2.39)-(2.41). 2
Therefore, when using the ergodic secret alignment technique, the best choice
for h̃1 and h̃2 is such that h̃ is orthogonal to h and that ‖h̃‖ = ‖h‖, and the best
choice for g̃1 and g̃2 is such that g̃ and g are linearly dependent and that ‖g̃‖ = ‖g‖,
i.e., g̃ = g. This choice makes the vector MAC between the two transmitters and
the main receiver equivalent to an orthogonal MAC, i.e., two independent single-user
fading channels, one from each transmitter to the main receiver. This equivalent main
32
receiver MAC channel can be expressed as
Ȳ1 = 2h1X1 + N̄1 (2.51)
Ȳ2 = 2h2X2 + N̄2 (2.52)
where Ȳ1 = Y1+Y2, Ȳ2 = Y1−Y2, N̄1 = N1+N2, and N̄2 = N1−N2. Note that N̄1 and
N̄2 are independent. On the other hand, this choice makes the vector MAC between
the two transmitters and the eavesdropper equivalent to a single scalar MAC. This
equivalent eavesdropper MAC channel can be expressed as






where Z̄1 = Z1 + Z2, Z̄2 = Z1 − Z2, N̄ ′1 = N ′1 + N ′2, and N̄ ′2 = N ′1 − N ′2. Note
again that N̄1 and N̄2 are independent. Note that, here, the second component of the
eavesdropper’s vector MAC is useless for her (i.e., leaks no further information than
the first component) as it contains only noise. This selection of the repetition channel
state yields a most favorable setting for the main receiver and a least favorable setting
for the eavesdropper.
2.6 Degrees of Freedom
In this section, we show that the secrecy sum rates achieved by our schemes scale
with SNR as 1
2
log(SNR) and that the secrecy sum rate achieved by the cooperative
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jamming scheme given in [18] does not scale with SNR. What we give here are rigorous
proofs for intuitive results. Since by looking at (2.32) and (2.41), one can note that,
if we assume that P̄1 = P̄2 = P , then if we take P1 = P2 = P , as P becomes large,
roughly speaking, in (2.32) the first term inside the expectation grows as log(P 2) while
the second term grows as log(P ) and hence the overall expression grows as 1
2
log(P );
and similarly, in (2.41), all three terms inside the expectation grow as log(P ) and
hence the overall expression grows as 1
2
log(P ). In the same way, by considering the
secrecy sum rate achieved by the cooperative jamming scheme given in (2.15), then
by referring to the power allocation policies given in [18], one can also roughly say
that for all channel states, as the available average power goes to infinity, the overall
expression converges to a constant.
For simplicity, we assume symmetric average power constraints for all schemes,
i.e., we set P̄1 = P̄2 = P in (2.33)-(2.34), (2.42)-(2.43), and (2.16). We also assume
that all channel gains are drawn from continuous bounded distributions and that all
channel gains have finite variances. Let Rs be the achievable secrecy sum rate, then






We start by the DoF analysis of our proposed schemes, i.e., the SBA scheme and the
ESA scheme, where we show that the sum secrecy rates obtained by these schemes
achieve 1
2
secure DoF, then we provide a rigorous proof for the fact that the scheme
of [18] which is based on i.i.d. Gaussian signaling with cooperative jamming achieves
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a secrecy sum rate that does not scale with SNR, i.e., achieves zero secure DoF.
2.6.1 Secure DoF with the SBA Scheme
We make the following choices for the power allocation policies P1 and P2 of the SBA
scheme. We set P1 =
1
2σ2g2
P , P2 =
1
2σ2g1
P . It can be verified that these choices satisfy
the power constraints (2.33)-(2.34). Denoting the expression inside the expectation





Eh,g {fP (h,g)} (2.56)












Now, we show that, for the two-user fading MAC-WT, a total number of secure
DoF η = 1
2
is achievable with the SBA scheme. Towards this end, it suffices to show
that the order of the limit and the expectation in (2.57) can be reversed. To do this,
we make use of Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem. Now, we note that for
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large enough P , fP (h,g)
log(P )
is upper bounded by ψ(h,g) where















































Hence, using the fact that all channel gains have finite variances together with Jensen’s
inequality, we have
Eh,g [ψ(h,g)] <∞ (2.59)
















Hence, from (2.57), we have η = 1
2
.
2.6.2 Secure DoF with the ESA Scheme
We show that the ESA scheme achieves η = 1
2
secure DoF in the two-user fading
MAC-WT. Here, we also use a constant power allocation policy for the ESA scheme
where we set P1 = P2 = P for all channel states. Clearly, this constant policy
satisfies the average power constraints (2.42)-(2.43). Denoting the expression inside
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We note that for large enough P , f̃P (h,g)
log(P )
≤ ψ̃(h,g) where










































2.6.3 Secure DoF with i.i.d. Gaussian Signaling with CJ
We consider the secrecy sum rate achieved by Gaussian signaling with cooperative
jamming (CJ) [18] in the fading MAC-WT and show that this achievable rate does
not scale with SNR. We start with the secrecy sum rate given by the right hand
side of (2.15). According to the optimal power allocation policy described in [18],
for k = 1, 2, we cannot have Pk > 0 and Qk > 0 simultaneously. Moreover, no
transmission occurs when |h1| ≤ |g1| and |h2| ≤ |g2|. Consequently, according to
the relative values of the channel gains (|h1|, |h2|, |g1|, |g2|), there are three different
cases left for the instantaneous secrecy sum rate achieved using the optimum power
allocation where we omitted the case where |h1| ≤ |g1| and |h2| ≤ |g2| since no
transmission is allowed.
Case 1: (h,g) ∈ D1 where D1 =
{
(h,g) : |h1| > |g1|, |h2| > |g2|
}
. Consequently,
Q1 = Q2 = 0. Thus, the instantaneous secrecy sum rate, Rs(h,g), can be written as
Rs(h,g) = log
(
1 + |h1|2P1 + |h2|2P2
1 + |g1|2P1 + |g2|2P2
)
(2.66)























Case 2: (h,g) ∈ D2 where D2 =
{




Q1 = P2 = 0. Thus, the instantaneous secrecy sum rate, Rs(h,g), can be written as
Rs(h,g) = log
(
1 + |h1|2P1 + |h2|2Q2








We can upper bound Rs(h,g) as













Case 3: (h,g) ∈ D3 where D3 =
{
(h,g) : |h1| < |g1|, |h2| > |g2|
}
. Consequently,
P1 = Q2 = 0. Thus, the instantaneous secrecy sum rate, Rs(h,g), can be written as
Rs(h,g) = log
(
1 + |h1|2Q1 + |h2|2P2








We can upper bound Rs(h,g) as













Now, since the instantaneous sum rate is zero outside D1 ∪ D2 ∪ D3, then from




























































where, for k = 1, 2, f(|hk|2) and f(|gk|2) are the density functions of |hk|2 and |gk|2,







log(1+x)dx| = 2− log(e) <∞, and f(|hk|2), f(|gk|2) are continuous
and bounded for k = 1, 2, it follows that each of the three integrals in the above
expression is finite. Hence, we have Rs <∞, and that Rs is bounded from above by






2.7 ESA Scheme with Cooperative Jamming
The result given in Theorem 2.2 can be strengthened by adding the technique of
cooperative jamming to the ESA scheme of Section 2.5. We refer to the resulting
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scheme as ESA/CJ. This is done through Gaussian channel prefixing as discussed
in Section 2.3. In particular, we choose the channel inputs in (2.35)-(2.38) to be
X1 = V1 + T1 and X2 = V2 + T2, and then choose V1, V2, T1, T2 to be independent
Gaussian random variables. Namely, for k = 1, 2, Vk and Tk are Gaussian random
variables with zero mean and variances Pk and Qk, respectively. Here, V1 and V2
carry messages, while T1 and T2 are jamming signals. The powers of (V1, T1) and
(V2, T2) should be chosen to satisfy the average power constraints of users 1 and 2,
respectively. After these selections are made, the transmitters repeat their channel
inputs X1 and X2 over two time instants in the same way described in the ESA
scheme of Section 2.5. In particular, when transmitters 1 and 2 repeat X1 and X2,
they repeat their selections of (V1, T1) and (V2, T2), respectively. Accordingly, the
ESA scheme yield the following achievable rate region which, through an appropriate
power control strategy (see Section 2.9), can be made strictly larger than the region

































































where, for k = 1, 2, Pk and Qk are the transmission and jamming power allocation
policies, respectively, of user k, and are both functions of h and g in general. In
addition, they satisfy the average power constraints
E[Pk +Qk] ≤ P̄k, k = 1, 2 (2.78)
2.8 Maximizing Secrecy Sum Rate of the ESA Scheme
In this section, we consider the problem of maximizing the secrecy sum rate achieved
by the ESA scheme as a function of the power allocations P1 and P2 of users 1 and 2,
respectively. We define αk , 2|hk|2 and βk , 2|gk|2. Then, we define α , [α1 α2]T
and β , [β1 β2]




Eα,β{log (1 + α1P1) + log (1 + α2P2)− log (1 + β1P1 + β2P2)} (2.79)




Eα,β{log (1 + α1P1) + log (1 + α2P2)− log (1 + β1P1 + β2P2)} (2.80)
s.t. Eα,β [Pk(α,β)] ≤ P̄k, k = 1, 2 (2.81)
Pk(α,β) ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, ∀α,β (2.82)
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1 + β1P1 + β2P2




1 + β1P1 + β2P2
− (λ2 − µ2) = 0 (2.84)
for some λk, µk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2. It should be noted here that (2.83)-(2.84) are only
necessary conditions for the optimal power allocations P1 and P2 since the objective
function, i.e., the achievable secrecy sum rate, is not concave in (P1, P2) in general.
For each channel state, we distinguish between three non-zero forms that the
solution (P1, P2) of (2.83)-(2.84) may take. First, if P1 > 0 and P2 > 0, then µ1 =
µ2 = 0. Hence (P1, P2) is the positive common root of the following two quadratic
equations
α1 (1 + β2P2)− β1 = λ1 (1 + α1P1) (1 + β1P1 + β2P2) (2.85)
α2 (1 + β1P1)− β2 = λ2 (1 + α2P2) (1 + β1P1 + β2P2) (2.86)
Since it is hard to find a simple closed-form solution for the above system of equa-
tions, we solve this system numerically and obtain the positive common root (P1, P2).

































































From conditions (2.83)-(2.84), we can derive the following necessary and sufficient
conditions for the positivity of the optimal power allocation policies:








Consequently, according to conditions (2.89)-(2.90), we can divide the set of all pos-
sible channel states into 7 partitions such that in each partition the solution (P1, P2)
will either have one of the three forms stated above or will be zero. Hence, the power
allocation policy (P1, P2) that satisfies (2.83)-(2.84) and (2.81)-(2.82) can be fully
described in 7 different cases of the channel gains. The details of such cases are given
in the Appendix.
2.9 Maximizing Secrecy Sum Rate of the ESA/CJ Scheme
In this section, we consider the problem of maximizing the achievable secrecy sum rate
as a function in the power allocation policies P1 and P2 when cooperative jamming
technique is used on top of the ESA scheme. Again, we define αk , 2|hk|2 and
βk , 2|gk|2. Then, we define α , [α1 α2]T and β , [β1 β2]T . In this case, the
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log (1 + α1(P1 +Q1)) + log (1 + α2(P2 +Q2))
− log (1 + β1(P1 +Q1) + β2(P2 +Q2)) + log (1 + β1Q1 + β2Q2)
− log (1 + α1Q1)− log (1 + α2Q2)
}
(2.91)
s.t. Eα,β [Pk(α,β) +Qk(α,β)] ≤ P̄k, k = 1, 2 (2.92)
Pk(α,β), Qk(α,β) ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, ∀α,β (2.93)
We first show that, at any fading state, splitting a user’s power into transmission
and jamming is suboptimal, i.e., an optimum power allocation policy must not have
Pk > 0 and Qk > 0 simultaneously. We note that whether we split powers or not does
not affect the first three terms of the objective function since we can always convert
jamming power of user k into transmission power of the same user and vice versa
while keeping the sum Pk +Qk fixed. Hence, we consider the last three terms of the
sum rate. For convenience, we define
S = log (1 + β1Q1 + β2Q2)− log (1 + α1Q1)− log (1 + α2Q2) (2.94)
Consider, without loss of generality, the power allocation for user 1. We assume that
P ∗1 , Q
∗










does not depend on Q1. Consider a power allocation P1 = P
∗
1 − ε,Q1 = Q∗1 + ε.




1 and the first three terms in the expression of
the achievable sum rate do not change. On the other hand, if (2.95) is positive, any
positive ε results in an increase in the achievable sum rate and jamming with the
same sum power is better. While, if (2.95) is negative, then any negative ε results in
an increase in the achievable sum rate and transmitting with the same sum power is
better. If (2.95) is zero, then the sum rate does not depend on Q1 and we can set
it to zero, i.e., use the sum power in transmitting. Therefore, the optimum power
allocation will have either Pk > 0 or Qk > 0, but not both.
Suppose that P1, P2, Q1, and Q2 are the optimal power allocations. Then, the
necessary KKT conditions satisfy
α1
1 + α1(P1 +Q1)
− β1
1 + β1(P1 +Q1) + β2(P2 +Q2)
− (λ1 − µ1) = 0 (2.96)
α2
1 + α2(P2 +Q2)
− β2
1 + β1(P1 +Q1) + β2(P2 +Q2)
− (λ2 − µ2) = 0 (2.97)
α1
1 + α1(P1 +Q1)
− β1
1 + β1(P1 +Q1) + β2(P2 +Q2)
+
β1
1 + β1Q1 + β2Q2
− α1
1 + α1Q1
− (λ1 − ν1) = 0 (2.98)
α2
1 + α2(P2 +Q2)
− β2
1 + β1(P1 +Q1) + β2(P2 +Q2)
+
β2
1 + β1Q1 + β2Q2
− α2
1 + α2Q2
− (λ2 − ν2) = 0 (2.99)
for some λk, µk, νk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2. As in Section 2.8, we note that (2.96)-(2.99)
are only necessary conditions for the optimal power allocations P1, P2, Q1, and Q2
since the objective function, i.e., the achievable secrecy sum rate, is not concave
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in (P1, P2, Q1, Q2) in general. Therefore, we give power control policies P1, P2, Q1,
and Q2 that satisfy these necessary conditions. That is, we obtain one fixed point
(P1, P2, Q1, Q2) of the Lagrangian such that (P1, P2, Q1, Q2) satisfies the constraints
(2.92)-(2.93). The power allocation policy (P1, P2, Q1, Q2) that satisfies (2.96)-(2.99)
and (2.92)-(2.93) is described in detail in Appendix.
2.10 Numerical Results
In this section, we present some simple simulation results. We also plot the sum
secrecy rate achieved using our SBA and ESA schemes, as well as the i.i.d. Gaussian
signaling with cooperative jamming (GS/CJ) scheme in [18]. First, the secrecy sum
rates achieved by the SBA and the ESA schemes scale with SNR. Hence, these rates
exceed the one achieved by the GS/CJ scheme for high SNR. Second, the secrecy sum
rate achieved by the ESA scheme is larger than the one achieved by the SBA scheme
for all SNR.
In our first set of simulations, we use a rudimentary power allocation policy for
our SBA and ESA schemes. For the SBA scheme, we first note, from (2.32), that the
































where ho = [h1o h2o]
T , he = [h1e h2e]
T , go = [g1o g2o]
T , and ge = [g1e g2e]
T . For those
channel gains ho,go for which the inner expectation with respect to he,ge is negative,
we set P1 = P2 = 0. Otherwise, we set P1 =
1
2σ2g
P̄1 and P2 =
1
2σ2g
P̄2. Note that turning
off the powers for some values of the channel gains ho,go is possible since P1 and P2
are functions of ho and go. Secondly, note that, if a power allocation satisfies the
average power constraints, then the modified power allocation where the powers are
turned off at some channel states, also satisfies the power constraints. For the ESA
















1 + 2(|g1|2P1 + |g2|2P2)
)}
(2.101)
In this case, we set P1 = P2 = 0 for those values of channel gains for which the
difference inside the expectation is negative. Otherwise, we set P1 = P̄1 and P2 = P̄2.
Again, turning the powers off does not violate power constraints for a power allocation
scheme which already satisfies the power constraints. For the GS/CJ scheme, we use
the power allocation scheme described in [18].
In Figure 2.1, the secrecy sum rate achieved by each of the three schemes is
plotted versus the average SNR that we define as 1
2
(P̄1 + P̄2). In all simulations, we
set σ2h1 = σ
2
h2
= 1.0, we also take σ2g1 = σ
2
g2
= 0.75. Clearly, the secrecy sum rate
achieved by the GS/CJ scheme saturates as we increase the SNR while the secrecy
sum rate achieved by the SBA and the ESA schemes grows unboundedly with the
SNR. One can also notice, as discussed earlier, that the secrecy sum rate achieved by
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Figure 2.1: Achievable secrecy sum-rates of the SBA, the ESA, and GS/CJ schemes
as function of the SNR for two different values of σ2g .
the ESA scheme is larger than the one achieved by the SBA scheme which is due to
the fact that the ESA scheme creates two totally uncorrelated parallel MAC channels
(i.e., orthogonal MAC) between the transmitters and the main receiver.
Next, in Figure 2.2, we plot secrecy sum rates achievable with constant power
allocation together with secrecy sum rates achievable with power control for the ESA
scheme with and without cooperative jamming. It is clear here that the secrecy sum
rate achieved by the ESA/CJ scheme (with power control) is larger than the rate
achieved when the ESA scheme is used solely without cooperative jamming (with or
without power control). One may also note that, for low SNR, the GS/CJ scheme still
gives better rates than those achieved by all the proposed schemes which is due to
the factor of 1
2
in the rates achieved by the proposed schemes due to code repetition.
49
4 5 6 4 6 5 7 4 7 5 8 4 8 5 9 4 9 5467
895
:;
< = > ? @ A > B C D E F G H
I JKLMN OPQRN ST UV MWWOX JSOY
Z B < [ \ ] ^ [ _ ` ^ > ? a ` b c ? ` d e
σf g 4 h ; 5Z B < ^ [ _ ` ^ > ? a ` b c ? ` d e
σf g 4 h ; 5Z B < ^ [ ` i c _ ` ^ > ? a ` b c ? ` d e
σf g 4 h ; 5j B [ \ ] ^ [ _ ` ^ > ? a ` b c ? ` d e
σf g 4 h ; 5
Figure 2.2: Achievable secrecy sum rates for the ESA scheme with and without power
control, the ESA/CJ scheme with power control, and the GS/CJ scheme as functions
of the SNR for two different values of σ2g .
2.11 The SBA and ESA schemes for the K-user Fading MAC-WT
Channel
Let K , {1, ..., K}. We consider the K-user MAC-WT for which the channel outputs











where, for k ∈ K, hk, gk, Xk, N, N ′ are as defined in Section 2.2. The average power
constraints are given by
E[|Xk|2] ≤ P̄k, k ∈ K (2.104)
2.11.1 The SBA scheme
Here, we use a repetition code in which each transmitter repeats its channel input
symbol over K consecutive time instants. Moreover, in every time instant, ∀k ∈ K,
transmitter k multiplies its channel input by
∏
i∈K\{k} gi. Thus, over K consecutive

















j , 1 ≤ j ≤ K (2.106)
where Yj and Zj denote the observations at the jth time instant at each of the main
receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, hij and gij denote the channel coefficients
at the jth time instant from the ith transmitter to the main receiver and the eaves-












 ≤ P̄k, k ∈ K (2.107)
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It is clear from (2.105)-(2.106) that the observed signal space (without noise, i.e., at
high SNR) of the main receiver over the K consecutive time instants is K-dimensional
almost surely whereas that of the eavesdropper is one-dimensional. Indeed, one can
express (2.105)-(2.106) as
Y = HX+N (2.108)
Z = GX+N′ (2.109)
where X = [X1, ..., XK ]
T ,Y = [Y1, ..., YK ]
T , Z = [Z1, ..., ZK ]
T , H is K ×K full-rank
matrix of effective channel gains from the transmitters to the main receiver, and G
is K × K unit-rank matrix of effective channel gains from the transmitters to the














EH,G {log (det (I+HSH∗))− log (det (I+GSG∗))} (2.112)
where S , Cov(X) = diag (P1, ..., PK) and A
∗ denotes the conjugate transpose of the
matrix A.
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In fact, the system given in (2.108) is equivalent to K ×K MIMO channel with
independent signaling across the antennas. Since H is full-rank, such MIMO channel
possesses exactly K DoF. On the other hand, the system given in (2.109) is equivalent
to K×K MIMO channel with independent signaling across the antennas and since G
is unit-rank, such MIMO channel possesses exactly 1 DoF. Therefore, while deriving
the total secure DoF achieved by the SBA scheme, conditioned on H and G, the first
term inside the expectation above yields K DoF whereas the second term inside the
expectation yields 1 DoF. Thus, the total achievable secure DoF is η = K−1
K
.
2.11.2 The ESA scheme
In order to extend the ESA scheme to the case of more than two users, i.e., K-
user fading MAC-WT channel with K ≥ 2, we use a repetition code, where each
code symbol is repeated K times over K channel uses. However, unlike the SBA
scheme, repetition is done over channel uses that hold certain conditions relative to
those conditions in the channel use where this code symbol is first transmitted. For
1 ≤ ` ≤ K, let
h` , [h1`, ..., hK`]
T (2.113)
g` , [g1`, ..., gK`]
T (2.114)
where hk` and gk` denote the channel coefficients at the `th channel use from the
kth transmitter to the main receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. Following
the same steps given in Section 2.5, one can easily verify that the optimal repetition
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channel use `, 2 ≤ ` ≤ K (relative to the channel use where the first copy of the
symbol is transmitted) must be chosen such that
h` = U`h1 (2.115)















−1. Note that, as explained in Section 2.5, the above argument is
based on the proof of the ergodic interference alignment technique given in [14].
The main idea is to quantize the channel coefficients and then group the sets of
coefficients of symmetric types together. That is indeed tantamount to grouping
{h`, g` : 1 ≤ ` ≤ K} together. Note that indeed this is possible due to the circular
symmetry of the distribution of the channel coefficients. Then, using the continuity of
the achievable rate as a function in channel coefficients, by decreasing the quantization
bin size, one can approach the desired rate in the limit.
According to the selection given by (2.115)-(2.116), one can describe the main










for ` = 1, ..., K, where Y` and Z` are the observations at channel use ` at the main
receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, N` and N
′
` are the noise values at channel
use ` at the main receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, and X = [X1, ..., XK ]
where Xk, k ∈ K is the channel input of transmitter k.
Using similar argument to the one in Section 2.5, it is easy to see that the system in
(2.118) is equivalent to an orthogonal K-user MAC channel where each component of
such orthogonal MAC channel has unit-variance noise and channel gain
√
Khk1, k ∈
K, whereas the system in (2.119) is equivalent to one-dimensional MAC channel with
unit-variance noise and channel gains
√
Kgk1, k ∈ K. Hence, the achievable secrecy




















Therefore, by using the same approach of Section 2.6.2, one can easily verify that
the total secure DoF achievable by the ESA scheme in the K-user fading MAC-WT




In this chapter, we proposed two new achievable schemes for the fading multiple access
wiretap channel. Our first scheme, the scaling based alignment (SBA) scheme, lets the
interfering signals at the main receiver live in a two-dimensional space, while it aligns
the interfering signals at the eavesdropper in a one-dimensional space. We obtained
the secrecy rate region achieved by this scheme. We showed that the secrecy rates
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achieved by this scheme scale with SNR as 1
2
log(SNR), i.e., a total of 1
2
secure DoF
is achievable in the two-user fading MAC-WT. We also showed that the secrecy sum
rate achieved by the i.i.d. Gaussian signaling with cooperative jamming scheme does
not scale with SNR, i.e., the achievable secure DoF is zero. As a direct consequence,
we showed the suboptimality of the i.i.d. Gaussian signaling based schemes with or
without cooperative jamming in the fading MAC-WT.
Our second scheme, the ergodic secret alignment (ESA) scheme, is inspired by
the ergodic interference alignment technique. In this scheme each transmitter repeats
its symbols over carefully chosen time instants such that the interfering signals from
the transmitters are aligned favorably at the main receiver while they are aligned
unfavorably at the eavesdropper. We obtained the secrecy rate region achieved by this
scheme and showed that, as in the scaling based alignment scheme, the secrecy sum
rate achieved by the ergodic secret alignment scheme scales with SNR as 1
2
log(SNR).
In addition, we introduced an improved version of our ESA scheme where cooperative
jamming is used as an additional ingredient to achieve higher secrecy rates. Moreover,
since the rate expressions achieved with the SBA scheme seem complicated, while the
rate expressions achieved with the two versions of the ESA scheme (with and without
cooperative jamming) are more amenable for optimization of power allocations, we
derived the necessary conditions for the optimal power allocation that maximizes
the secrecy sum rate achieved by the ESA scheme when used solely and when used
with cooperative jamming. Finally, we discussed the extension of our schemes to the
case of more than two users and showed that, for the K-user fading MAC-WT, our





2.13.1 Power Control for the ESA Scheme
Here, we discuss the cases of the power allocation policy of Section 2.8.
1. α1 ≤ λ1, α2 − β2 ≤ λ2 or α1 − β1 ≤ λ1, α2 ≤ λ2. In this case, P1 = P2 = 0.
To prove this, suppose without loss of generality that α1 ≤ λ1, α2−β2 ≤ λ2. We
note that α1 ≤ λ1 implies that α1 − β1(1+β2P2) ≤ λ1 which, using (2.89), implies
that P1 = 0. Hence, from (2.90), we must also have P2 = 0. In the same way,
we can show that when α1 − β1 ≤ λ1, α2 ≤ λ2, we also must have P1 = P2 = 0.
2. α1 ≤ λ1, α2 − β2 > λ2. In this case, P1 = 0 and P2 > 0 where P2 is
given by (2.88). As in the previous case, α1 ≤ λ1, using (2.89), implies that
P1 = 0. Hence, from (2.90), we must have P2 > 0.
3. α1 − β1 > λ1, α2 ≤ λ2. In this case, P1 > 0 and P2 = 0 where P1 is
given by (2.87). This case is the same as the previous one with roles of users 1
and 2 interchanged.
4. λ1 < α1 ≤ λ1 + β1, λ2 < α2 ≤ λ2 + β2. In this case, the solution (P1, P2)
may not be unique. Namely, we either have P1 > 0 and P2 > 0, or we have
P1 = P2 = 0. This is due to the following facts. It is easy to see that P1 = P2 = 0
satisfies α1 − β1(1+β2P2) ≤ λ1 and α2 −
β2
(1+β1P1)
≤ λ2, i.e., satisfies conditions
(2.89) and (2.90). It is also easy to see that we can find positive P1 and P2
such that α1 − β1(1+β2P2) > λ1 and α2 −
β2
(1+β1P1)
> λ2, i.e., there exist positive
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P1 and P2 that satisfy (2.89) and (2.90). Hence the solution (P1, P2) may
not be unique. It remains to show that we cannot have P1 > 0, P2 = 0 or
P1 = 0, P2 > 0. Suppose without loss of generality that P1 > 0, P2 = 0. Hence,
we have α1 − β1(1+β2P2) = α1 − β1 ≤ λ1 which implies that P1 = 0 which is a
contradiction. Thus, we cannot have P1 > 0, P2 = 0. In the same way, it can
be shown that we cannot have P1 = 0, P2 > 0. Hence, we obtain our power
allocation policy for this case as follows. We examine the solution of equations
(2.85)-(2.86), if it yields a real and non-negative solution (P1, P2)
1, then we take
it as our solution (P1, P2) for this case. Otherwise, we set P1 = P2 = 0.
5. λ1 < α1 ≤ λ1+β1, α2−β2 > λ2. In this case, we must have P2 > 0. However, we
either have P1 > 0 or P1 = 0. This can be shown as follows. We note that
α2 − β2 > λ2 implies that α2 − β2(1+β1P1) > λ2 for any P1 ≥ 0. Hence, by (2.90),
we must have P2 > 0. However, we either have P1 > 0 or P1 = 0 depending on
whether the value of P2 satisfies α1− β1(1+β2P2) > λ1 or not. We obtain our power
allocation policies as follows. We first solve (2.85)-(2.86), if this yields a real
and non-negative solution (P1, P2), then we take it to be the power allocation
values for this case. Otherwise, we set P1 = 0 and P2 is obtained from (2.88).
6. α1 − β1 > λ1, λ2 < α2 ≤ λ2 + β2. By the symmetry between this case and the
previous case, we must have P1 > 0 while we either have P2 > 0 or P2 = 0.
We obtain our power allocation policies in a fashion similar to that of case 4
and case 5. In particular, we first solve (2.85)-(2.86), if this yields a real and
1Note that there is at most one such common root for these two quadratic equations.
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non-negative solution (P1, P2), then we take it to be the power allocation values
for this case. Otherwise, we set P2 = 0 and P1 is obtained from (2.87).
7. α1−β1 > λ1, α2−β2 > λ2. Here, we must have P1 > 0 and P2 > 0. This is due to
the fact that α1−β1 > λ1 and α2−β2 > λ2 imply that α1− β1(1+β2P2) > λ1 and α2−
β2
(1+β1P1)
> λ2, respectively. Hence, from (2.89)-(2.90), we must have P1 > 0 and P2 > 0.
The values of P1 and P2 are given by the positive common root (P1, P2) of (2.85)-
(2.86) which, in this case, have only one positive common root.
2.13.2 Power Control for the ESA/CJ Scheme
Here, we discuss the power allocation policy of Section 2.9.
For each channel state, since splitting power between transmission and jamming
is sub-optimal, we can distinguish between five non-zero forms that the solution
(P1, P2, Q1, Q2) of (2.96)-(2.99) may take. First, if P1 > 0, P2 > 0 and Q1 = Q2 = 0,
then µ1 = µ2 = 0. Hence, from (2.96)-(2.97), we conclude that (P1, P2) is the posi-
tive common root of equations (2.85)-(2.86) which are found in Section 2.8 and are
rewritten here:
α1 (1 + β2P2)− β1 = λ1 (1 + α1P1) (1 + β1P1 + β2P2) (2.121)
α2 (1 + β1P1)− β2 = λ2 (1 + α2P2) (1 + β1P1 + β2P2) (2.122)
This root can be obtained through numerical solution. Secondly, if P1 > 0, Q2 > 0
and P2 = Q1 = 0, then µ1 = ν2 = 0. Hence, from (2.96) and (2.98), we conclude that
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(P1, Q2) is the positive common root of
α1 (1 + β2Q2)− β1 = λ1 (1 + α1P1) (1 + β1P1 + β2Q2) (2.123)
β2β1P1 = λ2 (1 + β2Q2) (1 + β1P1 + β2Q2) (2.124)
which can also be obtained through numerical solution. Thirdly, if P2 > 0, Q1 > 0
and P1 = Q2 = 0, then µ2 = ν1 = 0. Hence, from (2.97) and (2.99), we conclude that
(P2, Q1) is the positive common root of
α2 (1 + β1Q1)− β2 = λ2 (1 + α2P2) (1 + β1Q1 + β2P2) (2.125)
β1β2P2 = λ1 (1 + β1Q1) (1 + β1Q1 + β2P2) (2.126)
which again can be obtained through numerical solution. The fourth non-zero form
of (P1, P2, Q1, Q2) is when P1 > 0 and P2 = Q1 = Q2 = 0, then µ1 = 0. Hence, from

































The last non-zero form of (P1, P2, Q1, Q2) is when P2 > 0 and P1 = Q1 = Q2 = 0,


































We obtain the following sufficient conditions on zero jamming powers Q1 and Q2.




1 + β1Q1 + β2Q2




1 + β1Q1 + β2Q2
+ µ2 − ν2 = 0 (2.130)
which, by using the fact that the two users cannot be jamming together, give the
following conditions
Q1 = 0, if α1 > β1 (2.131)
Q2 = 0, if α2 > β2 (2.132)
Moreover, we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for the positivity of power
allocations in the possible transmission/jamming scenarios in each channel state.
First, when no user jams, i.e., Q1 = Q2 = 0, then from (2.96)-(2.97), we obtain the
necessary and sufficient conditions (2.89)-(2.89) of Section 2.8 which we repeat here
61
for convenience.








Secondly, when user 1 does not jam and user 2 does not transmit, i.e., Q1 = P2 = 0,
then from (2.96) and (2.98), we can easily derive the following necessary and sufficient
conditions for the positivity of the transmission power P1 of user 1 and the jamming
power Q2 of user 2.








Thirdly, when user 1 does not transmit and user 2 does not jam, i.e., P1 = Q2 = 0,
then from (2.97) and (2.99), we can similarly derive the following necessary and
sufficient conditions for the positivity of the transmission power P2 of user 2 and the
jamming power Q1 of user 1.








Using conditions (2.131)-(2.138) given above, the power allocation policy (P1, P2, Q1, Q2)
that satisfies (2.96)-(2.99) and (2.92)-(2.93) can be fully described through the fol-
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lowing cases of the channel gains.
1. α1 > β1, α2 > β2. In this case, we must have Q1 = Q2 = 0. This follows
directly from (2.131)-(2.132). Hence, this case reduces to one of the 7 cases
given in Section 2.8 depending on the relative values of the channel gains and
the values of λ1 and λ2. We can obtain the power allocations P1 and P2 in the
same way described in Section 2.8.
2. α1 > β1, α2 < β2. In this case, we must have P2 = Q1 = 0. This can be shown
as follows. From (2.131), we must have Q1 = 0. Suppose P2 > 0. Hence,
µ2 = 0. Since dividing power among transmission and jamming is suboptimal,
then we must have Q2 = 0. Since Q1 = 0, then (2.130) implies h̄2 − ḡ2 ≥ 0
which is a contradiction. Therefore, P2 = 0. The power allocations P1 and Q2
are obtained from one of the following sub-cases:
(a) α1 ≤ λ1 or α1 − β1 ≤ λ1, β2 ≤ λ2. We have P1 = Q2 = 0. To see this,
note that α1 ≤ λ1 implies that α1− β1(1+β2Q2) ≤ λ1. Hence, using (2.135), we
must have P1 = 0 and thus Q2 = 0 since we cannot have a jamming user
when the other user is not transmitting. On the other hand, if β2 ≤ λ2,
then it follows from (2.136) that Q2 = 0. Hence, the fact that α1−β1 ≤ λ1
together with (2.135) implies that P1 = 0.
(b) α1 − β1 > λ1, β2 ≤ λ2. We have Q2 = 0 and P1 > 0 where P1 is
given by (2.127). This can be shown to be true as follows. Since β2 ≤ λ2,
then, using (2.136), we must have Q2 = 0. Hence, from (2.135) and the
fact that α1 − β1 > λ1 in this case, we must have P1 > 0.
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(c) λ1 < α1 ≤ λ1 + β1, β2 > λ2. In this case, the solution (P1, Q2) may
not be unique. Namely, we either have P1 > 0 and Q2 > 0, or we have
P1 = Q2 = 0. This is due to the following facts. It is easy to see that




conditions (2.135) and (2.136). It is also easy to see that we can find




i.e. conditions (2.135) and (2.136). Hence the solution (P1, Q2) may not be
unique. It remains to show that we cannot have P1 > 0, Q2 = 0. Suppose
that P1 > 0 and Q2 = 0. Hence, we have α1 − β1(1+β2Q2) = α1 − β1 ≤ λ1
which, by (2.135), implies that P1 = 0 which is a contradiction. Thus, we
cannot have P1 > 0 and Q2 = 0. We obtain our power allocation policies
for this case as follows. We examine the solution of equations (2.123) and
(2.124), if it yields a real and non-negative solution (P1, Q2), then we take
it as our solution (P1, Q2) for this case. Otherwise, we set P1 = Q2 = 0.
(d) α1 − β1 > λ1, β2 > λ2. Here, we must have P1 > 0. However, we either
have Q2 > 0 or Q2 = 0, i.e., the solution may not be unique. To see this,
we note that α1 − β1 > λ1 implies that α1 − β1(1+β2Q2) > λ2 for any Q2 ≥ 0.
Hence, by (2.135), we must have P1 > 0. However, we either have Q2 > 0
or Q2 = 0 depending on whether the value of P1 satisfies β2− β2(1+β1P1) > λ1
or not. We obtain our power allocation policy as follows. We first solve
(2.123) and (2.124), if this yields a real and non-negative solution (P1, Q2),
then we take it to be the power allocation values for this case. Otherwise,
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we set Q2 = 0 and P1 is obtained from (2.127).
3. α1 < β1, α2 > β2. From the symmetry between this case and the previous case,
the power allocation roles can be obtained in this case by interchanging the
power allocation roles of users 1 and 2 in the previous case. In particular, we
must have P1 = Q2 = 0. The power allocations P2 and Q1 are given by one of
the following sub-cases:
(a) α2 ≤ λ2 or β1 ≤ λ1, α2 − β2 ≤ λ2. We have P2 = Q1 = 0.
(b) β1 ≤ λ1, α2 − β2 > λ2. We have Q1 = 0 and P2 > 0 where P2 is
given by (2.128).
(c) β1 > λ1, λ2 < α2 ≤ λ2 + β2. In this case, the solution (P2, Q1) may not be
unique as we either have P2 > 0 and Q1 > 0, or have P1 = Q2 = 0. There-
fore, we obtain our power allocation policy for this case by numerically
solving equations (2.125) and (2.126), if we have a real and non-negative
solution (P2, Q1), then we take it as to be the power allocation values for
this case. Otherwise, we set P2 = Q1 = 0.
(d) β1 > λ1, α2 − β2 > λ2. Here, we must have P2 > 0. However, we either
have Q1 > 0 or Q1 = 0, i.e., the solution may not be unique. We obtain
our power allocation policy as follows. We first solve (2.125)-(2.126), if
this yields a real and non-negative solution (P2, Q1), then we take it to be
the power allocation values for this case. Otherwise, we set Q1 = 0 and P2
is obtained from (2.128).
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4. α1 < β1, α2 < β2. In this case, we have P2 = Q1 = 0 or P1 = Q2 = 0. In
order to see this, suppose P1 > 0 and P2 > 0. Hence, µ1 = µ2 = 0. Since
splitting a user’s power into transmit and jamming powers is suboptimal, then
we must have Q1 = Q2 = 0. Thus, from (2.129) and (2.130), we have h̄1 ≥ ḡ1
and h̄2 ≥ ḡ2 which is a contradiction. Therefore, we must have either P1 = 0
or P2 = 0. The power allocation policy (P1, P2, Q1, Q2) is given in the following
four sub-cases of channel states:
(a) (α1 ≤ λ1 or β2 ≤ λ2) and (α2 ≤ λ2 or β1 ≤ λ1). In this case, we have
P1 = P2 = Q1 = Q2 = 0. To see this, first, suppose that P2 = Q1 = 0. We
note that if α1 ≤ λ1 then α1− β1(1+β2Q2) ≤ λ1. Hence, using (2.135), we must
have P1 = 0 and thus Q2 = 0 since we cannot have a jamming user when
the other user is not transmitting. On the other hand, if β2 ≤ λ2, then it
follows from (2.136) that Q2 = 0. Hence, the fact that α1 < β1 together
with (2.135) implies that P1 = 0. Next, suppose that P1 = Q2 = 0. Using
the fact that α2 ≤ λ2 or β1 ≤ λ1 together with condition (2.137)-(2.138),
we can show that P2 = Q1 = 0. Therefore, in this case, we must have
P1 = P2 = Q1 = Q2 = 0.
(b) (α2 ≤ λ2 or β1 ≤ λ1) and (α1 > λ1, β2 > λ2). We have P2 = Q1 = 0.
The solution (P1, Q2) may not be unique. In particular, we may have
P1 > 0, Q2 > 0 or have P1 = Q2 = 0. To see this, consider the following
argument. Using the fact that α2 ≤ λ2 or β1 ≤ λ1, then, as shown in
case 4(a), we conclude that we must have P2 = Q1 = 0. Now, we consider
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the power allocation policy (P1, Q2). We note that P1 = Q2 = 0 satisfies
conditions (2.135) and (2.136). On the other hand, we can find positive
P1 and Q2 that satisfy (2.135) and (2.135). Hence, the solution (P1, Q2)
may not be unique as we may have P1 = Q2 = 0 or P1 > 0, Q2 > 0. It
remains to show that we cannot have P1 > 0, Q2 = 0. Suppose that P1 > 0
and Q2 = 0. Hence, we have α1 − β1(1+β2Q2) = α1 − β1 < 0 < λ1 which,
by (2.135), implies that P1 = 0 which is a contradiction. Thus, we cannot
have P1 > 0 and Q2 = 0. Our power allocations P1 and Q2 are obtained
for this case as follows. We solve (2.123) and (2.124). If the solution gives
a real and non-negative common root (P1, Q2), we take it as our power
allocation values for P1 and Q2. Otherwise, we set P1 = Q2 = 0.
(c) (α1 ≤ λ1 or β2 ≤ λ2) and (α2 > λ2, β1 > λ1). By the symmetry
between this case and case 4(b), we have P1 = Q2 = 0. Again in this
case, the solution (P2, Q1) may not be unique. In particular, we may have
P2 > 0, Q1 > 0 or have P2 = Q1 = 0. In fact, the power allocation policy
in this case, can be obtained from case 4(b) by interchanging the roles of
users 1 and 2. Our power allocations P2 and Q1 are obtained as follows in
this case. We solve (2.125)-(2.126). If the solution gives a real and non-
negative common root (P2, Q1), we take it as our power allocation values
for P2 and Q1. Otherwise, we set P2 = Q1 = 0.
(d) (α1 > λ1, β2 > λ2) and (α2 > λ2, β1 > λ1). Here, again the solution
(P1, P2, Q1, Q2) is not unique as we may either have P1 > 0, Q2 > 0, P2 =
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Q1 = 0, or P2 > 0, Q1 > 0, P1 = Q2 = 0, or P1 = P2 = Q1 = Q2 = 0. To
see this, first, suppose that P2 = Q1 = 0 and consider the power allocation
policy (P1, Q2). As in case 4(b), we can show that the solution (P1, Q2) may
not be unique as we may have P1 = Q2 = 0 or P1 > 0, Q2 > 0. However,
as shown in case 4(b), we cannot have P1 > 0, Q2 = 0. Next, suppose
that P1 = Q2 = 0 and consider the power allocation policy (P2, Q1). As
in case 4(c), we can show that the solution (P2, Q1) may not be unique as
we may have P2 = Q1 = 0 or P2 > 0, Q1 > 0. However, we cannot have
P2 > 0, Q1 = 0. We obtain our allocation policy (P1, P2, Q1, Q2) as follows.
Let us denote the solution of (2.123) and (2.124) together by solution A
and denote the solution of (2.125) and (2.126) together by solution B.
i. If solution A yields a real non-negative (P1, Q2) while solution B does
not yield real non-negative (P2, Q1), then we take (P1, Q2) to be the
power allocation values for users 1 and 2, respectively, and set P2 =
Q1 = 0.
ii. If solution B yields a real non-negative (P2, Q1) while solution A does
not yield real non-negative (P1, Q2), then we take (P2, Q1) to be the
power allocation values for users 2 and 1, respectively, and set P1 =
Q2 = 0.
iii. If neither solution A nor solution B gives real non-negative common
root, then we set P1 = P2 = Q1 = Q2 = 0.
iv. If both solutions A and B yield a real non-negative common root, then
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we either choose the root given by solution A, i.e., (P1, Q2), and set
P2 = Q1 = 0, or choose the root given by solution B, i.e., (P2, Q1), and
set P1 = Q2 = 0. We make the choice that maximizes the achievable
instantaneous secrecy sum rate.
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Chapter 3
Deaf Cooperation and Relay Selection Strategies for Secure
Communication in Multiple Relay Networks
3.1 Introduction
The notion of introducing artificial noise in a Gaussian wiretap (GWT) channel by a
helpful interferer to confuse the eavesdropper and improve over the secrecy capacity
of the original wiretap channel was introduced in [31], [34], [19], [20]. In [34], [19], [20],
this notion was called cooperative jamming (CJ). The term refers to the cooperation
strategy in which a helping interferer transmits white Gaussian noise when it can hurt
the eavesdropper more than it can hurt the legitimate receiver and hence improve the
achievable secrecy rate. In [33], the idea of helping interferer was applied to the
GWT channel in a scheme tantamount to the CJ scheme for the two-user multiple
access wiretap channel where one of the users performs cooperative jamming. In
[30], the destination carried out jamming over the feedback channel to confuse the
eavesdropper.
In the context of relay networks with secrecy constraints, the role of cooperative
jamming was further investigated in several works. For example, the discrete mem-
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oryless relay network was investigated in [32] where achievable secrecy rates were
developed when relays help increase secrecy rate by inserting noise into the network.
On the other hand, the relay selection problem in the secrecy context was investi-
gated, e.g., in [27] and [22]. In particular, reference [27] proposed a scheme that
enables an opportunistic selection of two relays to increase security where one relay
uses the decode-and-forward (DF) strategy while the other uses the CJ strategy to in-
troduce useful interference and thus help increase the achievable secrecy rate. In [22],
one relay node is selected to assist two source nodes to exchange messages with each
other using the amplify-and-forward (AF) strategy while one or two additional relay
nodes are selected to transmit jamming signals to confuse the eavesdropper. The
role of cooperative jamming in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers was studied
in [35] where noise generators (cooperative jammers) were employed in a multiple-
relay multiple-eavesdropper network to improve security. The impact of cooperative
jamming on the secrecy outage probability of a slow fading wiretap channel was stud-
ied in [36] where related security metrics, such as, jamming coverage and jamming
efficiency, were introduced and different jamming strategies were proposed depending
on the various levels of available channel state information. In a stochastic network
model, it was shown in [37] that packet collisions caused by jamming nodes can be
used to increase the level of secrecy.
Power allocation for the the source and relay nodes in cooperative jamming relay
networks was studied, e.g., in [24], [23], and [25]. In [24], the communication between
the source and destination occurs in two hops. Both the source and the relay are
allowed to split their available power into a useful information part and a jamming
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part. Reference [24] solves for the power allocation under the assumption that both
the relay and the destination have the knowledge of the jamming signals. In the
multiple antenna case, the power allocation and the antenna weights design problems
were investigated for cooperative jamming strategies under the constraint that the
jamming signals must lie in the subspace orthogonal to the channels to the legitimate
receiver.
In all the references above, the role of a helping node was restricted to coop-
erative jamming, decode-and-forward, and amplify-and-forward. However, a help-
ing node can also play other roles to improve secrecy. In general, in the relay-
eavesdropper channel, the relay, which is assumed to be a trusted entity, can help
improve secrecy either by listening to the source or by acting as a deaf helper.
The role of a relay node to provide and improve secrecy in a wiretap channel was
first studied in [29]. In particular, reference [29] introduced another passive (deaf)
mode of cooperation, called noise forwarding (NF), in which the relay node sends a
dummy (context-free) codeword drawn at random from a codebook that is known to
both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper to introduce helpful interference
that would hurt the eavesdropper more than the legitimate receiver. This deaf co-
operation strategy was applied without power control to the Gaussian single-relay
single-eavesdropper channel in [28]. The idea of such strategy is to create a vir-
tual multiple access wiretap channel where only one user (the source) is active, i.e.,
sending relevant information, while the other user (the relay) is acting as an inter-
ferer that sends a signal drawn from a given codebook. In this way, the destination
can perform successive decoding and cancel out the relay signal and achieve higher
72
secrecy rate for the intended message.
At this point, it is useful to compare the two aforementioned alternatives of deaf
cooperation for secrecy introduced in the literature. Generally speaking, it is not
useful to perform CJ when the helper is closer to the destination than to the eaves-
dropper, on the other hand, one can still introduce helpful interference in this case
by transmitting a dummy codeword from a codebook that is known to the destina-
tion and the eavesdropper. The transmission of dummy codewords refers to Wyner’s
idea of stochastic encoding for secrecy [21] where multiple codewords are associated
with a single message. Since the cost of these dummy codewords is a decrease in
the transmitter’s rate, if the helper takes the responsibility of sending these dummy
codewords, then the secrecy rate of the transmitter may improve [5].
In this chapter, we investigate in detail the conditions under which a deaf helper
performing either CJ or NF strategy would give rise to a larger achievable secrecy
rate than the secrecy capacity of the original GWT channel. In particular, we give
the necessary and sufficient conditions, in terms of power values and relative channel
gains, for each of the two strategies to yield higher secrecy rate than the secrecy
capacity of the original GWT channel. We also obtain, in terms of the channel gains
solely, the necessary conditions for each of the CJ and the NF strategies to yield a
secrecy rate higher than the secrecy capacity of the GWT channel. In particular, we
reach the following useful conclusion. Depending on the relative location of a helping
node with respect to the destination and the eavesdropper, a helping node may either
be a useful jammer or a useful noise forwarder but not both at the same time, or it
may not be useful at all as a deaf helper. Moreover, we derive the optimal power
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allocation policy for each of the two strategies where we assume that the source, the
deaf helper, the legitimate receiver, and the eavesdropper have perfect knowledge of
all the relevant channel gains.
On the other hand, we consider applying both CJ and NF strategies in multiple
relay networks to improve secrecy rates achievable when only CJ strategy is used.
In particular, we consider a multiple relay network of N relays in addition to a
source, a legitimate receiver, and an eavesdropper. The objective is to select a set of
K, K ≤ N, relays that act as the best deaf helpers, i.e., that maximize the secrecy
rate achievable by deaf cooperation using K relays. We first consider the special case
of K = 1. We propose an optimal Single Deaf Helper Selection (SDHS) strategy that
identifies the optimal deaf helper node and its mode of cooperation (CJ or NF). Our
strategy is simple and requires O(N) computations. Second, we consider the general
selection problem, i.e., the case where K > 1. Both the selection and the optimal
power allocation problems are hard in this case. In fact, the number of computations
required by the optimal selection strategy is exponential in N . Therefore, we propose
a suboptimal Multiple Deaf Helper Selection (MDHS) strategy that selectsK (or less)
relays over K (or less) selection stages in which the source and the relays negotiate
to identify the deaf helpers to be selected one by one in a greedy fashion. In terms
of the computational complexity, we show that our strategy is efficient and requires
O(N) computations as opposed to the optimal strategy which requires a number of
computations that is exponential in N . Finally, we give some numerical examples
to compare our strategies, in terms of the achievable secrecy rate, with those based
on only one mode of deaf cooperation. We also quantify through some numerical
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examples the improvement in the achievable secrecy rate when the MDHS strategy
is used instead of the SDHS strategy.
3.2 System Model
We first discuss briefly the basic discrete memoryless relay-eavesdropper channel
model, then we describe our system model. The discrete memoryless relay-eavesdropper
channel is a four-terminal channel consisting of alphabets Xs,Xr,Y ,Yr,Z, and a tran-
sition probability distribution p(y, yr, z|xs, xr) where Xs,Xr are the sets of the symbols
of the channel inputs at the source and the relay, respectively, while Y ,Yr,Z are the
sets of the symbols of the channel outputs at the destination, the relay, and the eaves-
dropper, respectively. The channel is memoryless, i.e., the channel outputs (yi, yr,i, zi)
at time i only depend on the channel inputs (xs,i, xr,i) at time i. The source wishes
to send a message Ws ∈ Ws = {1, . . . , 2nRs} to the destination using a (2nRs , n) code
consisting of a stochastic encoder ϕs at the source that maps the messageWs ∈ Ws to
a codeword Xns ∈ X ns , a relay encoder that maps the received signals (Yr,1, . . . , Yr,i−1)
received at the relay before time i to the channel input Xr,i using the mapping ϕr,i,
and a decoder ψ at the destination that maps the received sequence Y n to an estimate
of the message Ŵs ∈ Ws. The probability of error is






A rate Rs is said to be achievable with perfect secrecy if there is a (2









n) = 0 (3.2)
In this chapter, we consider the following communication scenario. A source,
s, sends a confidential message to a destination, d, over an AWGN channel in the
presence of an informed eavesdropper, e. The communication occurs in the presence
of a set of N nodes (relays), N = {r1, ..., rN}, from which one is selected (called the
helper) to help improve the achievable perfect secrecy through deaf cooperation, i.e.,
CJ or NF (see Figure 3.1). In other words, it is assumed that either the helper ignores
what it receives from the source, i.e., Yr, or that Yr is too noisy to be of any use to
the helper. Hence, at any time instant, the helper’s channel input Xr is independent
of Yr and Xs. In this case, the helper is called deaf and is supposed to operate in one
of the two aforementioned modes of deaf cooperation.
Assuming that the relay node r ∈ N is selected to be the deaf helper, the outputs













where γk,l, k ∈ {s, r}, l ∈ {d, e}, is the channel gain between nodes k and l, X̃k,
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Figure 3.1: A multiple relay network.
k ∈ {s, r} is the channel input at node k, and N, N ′ are real-valued zero mean, unit
variance AWGN at the destination and the eavesdropper, respectively. The channel
inputs satisfy the following average power constraints
E[X̃2k ] ≤ ρ̄k, k ∈ {s, r} (3.5)
It is assumed that all channel gains in (3.3)-(3.4) are known to s, d, r, and e. For a
fixed deaf helper node, r, the above system given by (3.3)-(3.4) and power constraints
(3.5) is equivalent to









E[X2k ] ≤ P̄k , ρ̄kγk,d, k ∈ {s, r} (3.8)
where Xk ,
√
γk,dX̃k and hk ,
γk,e
γk,d
, k ∈ {s, r}.
3.3 Improving Secrecy through Deaf Cooperation
In this section, we consider the CJ and the NF schemes. In both schemes, the channel
input at the source Xs in (4.1)-(4.2) is a symbol of the codeword that represents
the encoded confidential message. Such codeword is drawn from an i.i.d. Gaussian
codebook, i.e., Xs is Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance Ps where
Ps ≤ P̄s. Also, in both schemes, the channel input at the deaf helper Xr in (4.1)-
(4.2) is also Gaussian with zero mean and variance Pr where Pr ≤ P̄r. However, the
difference between the two schemes comes from the origin of Xr. In the CJ scheme,
Xr is white Gaussian noise that plays the same role as the background noise at the
destination and the eavesdropper except for the fact that it is generated artificially.
On the other hand, in the NF scheme, Xr is a symbol of a dummy (context-free)
codeword drawn from a Gaussian codebook that is assumed to be available at both
the destination and the eavesdropper. Accordingly, for given power values Ps and Pr,






(1 + Ps + Pr) (1 + hrPr)




Whereas the secrecy rate achievable by the NF scheme [29], RNF , is given by






(1 + Ps) (1 + hrPr)







1 + Ps + Pr
1 + hsPs + hrPr
)}
(3.10)
On the other hand, when no helper node is involved, the secrecy capacity of the











where (x)+ = max(0, x). In the following theorem, we give the necessary and sufficient
conditions for RCJ(Ps, Pr) ≥ CGWT (Ps) and RNF (Ps, Pr) ≥ CGWT (Ps).
Theorem 3.1 RCJ(Ps, Pr) ≥ CGWT (Ps) if and only if one of conditions (3.12) or
(3.13) below is satisfied:
hs < 1 ≤ hr and (hshr − 1) + hs(hr − 1)Ps ≥ hr(1− hs)Pr (3.12)




On the other hand, RNF (Ps, Pr) ≥ CGWT (Ps) if and only if one of conditions (3.14),
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(3.15), or (3.16) below is satisfied:
hr ≤ hs ≤ 1 (3.14)














A proof of Theorem 3.1 is given in the Appendix.
One important observation one can make in regard with Theorem 3.1 is that the
CJ strategy cannot be beneficial, i.e., it cannot achieve higher secrecy rate than the
secrecy capacity of the original GWT channel, if the value of the relative channel
gain between the relay node and the eavesdropper hr is less than 1 or less than the
value of the relative channel gain between the source and the eavesdropper hs. On
the other hand, the NF strategy is not useful, if hr > 1. This observation is stated
formally in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1 hr ≥ max(hs, 1) is a necessary condition for the CJ scheme to achieve
higher secrecy rate than the secrecy capacity of the original GWT channel. On the
other hand, hr ≤ 1 is a necessary condition for the NF scheme to achieve higher
secrecy rate than the secrecy capacity of the original GWT channel.
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3.4 Maximizing the Secrecy Rates Achievable by the CJ and NF
Schemes




RCJ(Pr, Ps) s.t. 0 ≤ Ps ≤ P̄s, 0 ≤ Pr ≤ P̄r (3.17)
max
Ps,Pr
RNF (Pr, Ps) s.t. 0 ≤ Ps ≤ P̄s, 0 ≤ Pr ≤ P̄r (3.18)
Let (P̂CJs , P̂
CJ




r ) be the maximizer of
(3.18). We define R̄CJ , RCJ(P̂CJs , P̂
CJ
r ) and R̄
NF , RNF (P̂NFs , P̂
NF
r ).
Theorem 3.2 The solution of (3.17) and (3.18) above is given in the following cases:
1. hs < 1: In this case, we have the following three possibilities depending on the
value of hr:
(a) If hs < 1 ≤ hr, then











P̂NFs = P̄s, P̂
NF
r = 0 (3.20)
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(b) If hs < hr < 1, then
P̂CJs = P̄s, P̂
CJ
r = 0 (3.21)
P̂NFs = P̄s (3.22)








(c) If hr ≤ hs < 1, then
P̂CJs = P̄s, P̂
CJ
r = 0 (3.25)














P̂NFr = P̄r (3.28)
2. hs ≥ 1: In this case, we have the following three possibilities depending on the
value of hr:
(a) If 1 ≤ hs < hr, then
P̂CJs = 0, P̂
CJ
















P̂NFs = 0, P̂
NF
r = 0 (3.31)
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(b) If hr < 1 ≤ hs, then
P̂CJs = 0, P̂
CJ
r = 0 (3.32)
P̂NFs = 0, P̂
NF














(c) If 1 ≤ hr ≤ hs, then
P̂CJs = 0, P̂
CJ
r = 0 (3.35)
P̂NFs = 0, P̂
NF




(hs(hr − hs)P̄s + hs(hr − 1))(hr − 1)hr − hr(1− hs)
hr(hr − hs)
(3.37)
A proof of Theorem 3.2 is given in the Appendix.
As a consequence of Theorem 3.2, one can identify, in terms of the relative channel
gains solely, the minimal set of necessary conditions for each of R̄CJ > CGWT and
R̄NF > CGWT to hold. These conditions are stated formally in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2 If R̄CJ > CGWT , then hr > max (1, hs). On the other hand, if R̄
NF >







3.5 Deaf Helper Selection Problem
3.5.1 Single Deaf Helper Selection
In this section, we are interested in selecting one relay from the set N of N relays
that would act as the best deaf helper that maximizes the achievable secrecy rate
which could be either R̄CJ if the best deaf helper is a cooperative jammer or R̄NF if
the best deaf helper is a noise forwarder. Here, we assume that the original power
constraints at the relays ρ̄r, r ∈ N given by (3.5) are equal. That is ρ̄r = ρ̄ ∀r ∈ N .
Consequently, the scaled power constraints at the relays P̄r, r ∈ N , given by (3.8),
have different values depending on the values of the corresponding channel gains
γr,d, r ∈ N . Thus, in order to clarify the presentation in this section, we choose
to consider the original system given by (3.3)-(3.4) together with the original power
constraints (3.5). Let ρs and ρr denote the variance of X̃s and X̃r, r ∈ N , respectively,
where ρs ≤ ρ̄s and ρr ≤ ρ̄r, r ∈ N .
The secrecy rates RCJ and RNF in (3.9) and (3.10), respectively, can be written






(1 + γs,dρs + γr,dρr) (1 + γr,eρr)
(1 + γs,eρs + γr,eρr) (1 + γr,dρr)
)
(3.38)






(1 + γs,dρs) (1 + γr,eρr)







1 + γs,dρs + γr,dρr




We note that all the results of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 as well as Corollary 3.1 are














k , respectively, for k ∈ {s, r} and r ∈ N where
(ρ̂CJs , ρ̂
CJ




r ) are the optimal power control policies that maximize
(3.38) and (3.39), respectively. Hence, using Corollary 3.2, one can find two disjoint
subsets of N which we denote by NCJ and NNF , where
NCJ ,
{










is the set of potential cooperative jammers, and
NNF ,
{










is the set of potential noise forwarders. In other words, the set NCJ is the set
that contains every relay node whose relative channel gain satisfies the condition
in Corollary 3.2 necessary for the CJ scheme to achieve a secrecy rate larger than
CGWT . On the other hand, the set NNF is the set that contains every relay node
whose relative channel gain satisfies the condition in Corollary 3.2 necessary for the
NF scheme to achieve a secrecy rate larger than CGWT . Since these two subsets are
disjoint, it follows that a node in N cannot be a useful cooperative jammer and a
useful noise forwarder at the same time. It is also noteworthy that there might be
some other nodes in N that do not fall in any of the two subsets NCJ and NNF .





r ) as functions of the channel gains (γr,d, γr,e) where r ∈ NCJ and r ∈ NNF ,
respectively. Hence, the optimal rates R̄CJ and R̄NF can be also regarded as func-
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tions of (γr,d, γr,e). Below, we describe a strategy for selecting the optimal relay node
r∗ ∈ N that maximizes the deaf cooperation secrecy rate.
3.5.2 Single Deaf Helper Selection (SDHS) Strategy
For each r ∈ N , using its knowledge of its own channel gains and using the conditions
in (3.40)-(3.41), r identifies which mode of cooperation (CJ or NF) it should target.
Accordingly, r computes one of the two rates R̄CJ (γr,d, γr,e) and R̄
NF (γr,d, γr,e) de-
pending on the target mode of cooperation. We note that the rate is computed using
the values of the optimal power allocations that are given by Theorem 3.2. Then
r sends this information to s. Upon receiving such information from all r ∈ N , s
identifies the relay r∗ with the maximum rate R∗ and knows its mode of cooperation.
Consequently, s notifies r∗ that it has been selected as the optimal deaf helper which
in turn notifies d of the former’s selection. It is assumed that this information is also
intercepted by e. By executing the SDHS strategy described above, the optimal re-
lay r∗ that achieves maxr∈N max{R̄CJ(γr,d, γr,e), R̄NF (γr,d, γr,e)} is identified together
with its mode of deaf cooperation.
Assuming that evaluating any of the rate or power functions given above requires
O(1) computations, since computation is done in a distributed fashion over N relays,
it follows that the complexity of the above strategy in terms of the number of compu-
tations required during its execution is O(N). This is due to the fact that finding the
maximum of all the rates received by s from all r ∈ N requires O(N) computations.
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3.5.3 Multiple Deaf Helpers Selection
The system permits us to involve at most K relays, 1 ≤ K ≤ N , in deaf cooperation.
Each relay can be either a cooperative jammer or a noise forwarder. Let KCJ ⊆ NCJ
denote the set of the selected cooperative jammers and KNF ⊆ NNF denote the set of
the selected noise forwarders where |KCJ ⋃KNF | ≤ K. The achievable secrecy rate
in this case for fixed power values ρs, ρr, r ∈ KCJ
⋃KNF , is given as a function of
(KCJ ,KNF ) by




























In fact, the problem of finding the optimal set of deaf helpers whose size is at most K
is hard for K > 1 in general. Not only the selection problem is hard in this case, but
also even if we fix K deaf helpers, K > 1, then the problem of finding the optimal
power allocations becomes analytically intractable in this case. Consequently, no
closed-form solutions could be found and we are left with search algorithms whose
running time could be unacceptably large and their convergence to the global optimum
is not even guaranteed. Hence, we propose below a suboptimal strategy that builds
upon the SDHS strategy presented earlier to select at most K out of the available N
relays that would possibly operate in different modes of cooperation to achieve larger
secrecy rate.
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3.5.4 Multiple Deaf Helpers Selection (MDHS) Strategy
The strategy is carried out over at mostK stages to select at mostK deaf helpers. We
define KCJi and KNFi as the set of selected cooperative jammers and noise forwarders
by the end of stage i, respectively. Before the first selection stage, we have KCJ0 =
KNF0 = ∅. In the first stage, we run the SDHS strategy to obtain the best deaf helper
r∗1 ∈ N , identify its mode of cooperation (CJ or NF), and compute the corresponding
achievable secrecy rate R∗1. These are all made known to s. Moreover, the identity
of r∗1 and its cooperation mode are known to d, e, and the rest of the relays by the
end of the first stage. Accordingly, we either have KCJ1 = {r∗1} and KNF1 = ∅ or vice
versa depending on the identified mode of cooperation of r∗1. For 2 ≤ i ≤ K, fix
the transmission powers as ρs = ρ̄s and ρr = ρ̄r, r ∈ N . For each r ∈ N \ {r∗j :
1 ≤ j ≤ i − 1}, r computes two secrecy rates, namely, R
(





KCJi−1, KNFi−1 ∪ {r}
)
using (3.42), i.e., the secrecy rates when r plays the role of a
cooperative jammer and when it plays the role of a noise forwarder. Hence, r finds
the maximum of the two rates and its corresponding mode of cooperation. Then
r sends this rate to s. Consequently, s finds the maximum R∗i of all the rates it
receives from all the relays involved in stage i. If R∗i ≤ R∗i−1, then the strategy is
terminated and the last selection stage would be i − 1. Otherwise, s identifies the
relay r∗i corresponding to the rate R
∗
i and its mode of cooperation. Upon termination
at stage t, 1 ≤ t ≤ K, the set of the selected deaf helpers {r∗i : 1 ≤ i ≤ t} and their
modes of cooperation are eventually known to s, d, and e and the achievable secrecy
rate in this case is R∗t .
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To derive the complexity of the MDHS strategy above, first, we note that in the










KCJi−1, KNFi−1 ∪ {r}
)
. For each choice,
each relay r ∈ N has to find the minimum of 2i terms. The evaluation of each of
these terms is assumed to involve i computations. Thus, each relay r ∈ N performs
(i + 1)2i computations to evaluate the rate in (3.42). Since each relay r does this
computation twice
(




, then the total number of
computation done by each relay is (i+1)2i+1. At the source s, finding the maximum




i−1 requires a single
computation. Thus, the ith stage of the MDHS strategy requires N + (i+ 1)2i+1 + 1
computations. Note that each relay r ∈ N computes the rate in (3.42) on its own,
i.e., the computation of all the rates is done in a distributed fashion over the N relays
in every stage of the strategy. That is why the term (i + 1)2i+1 is not scaled by N .
Since there are at most K selection stages in the MDHS strategy, in the worst case,
the total number of computations required in the execution of the MDHS strategy is
K(2K+3−2K+2+N+1)+2 which is indeed O(N) since K is assumed to be a constant
that does not depend on N . Thus, our strategy is efficient. On the other hand, an
optimal strategy that computes the achievable secrecy rate using every possible set
of relays M ⊆ N with |M| ≤ K, then finding the maximum rate together with the







2N−i ((i+ 1)2i + 1)
computations which is greater than 2N computations.
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3.6 Numerical Results
First, we consider the single deaf helper case. We compare the two modes of deaf
cooperation and verify the conditions of Corollary 3.2 by plotting the optimal secrecy
rate achievable by each of CJ and NF modes against the relative channel gain between
the deaf helper and the eavesdropper, hr.
In Figure 3.2, we set the scaled power constraints of the source and the deaf
helper defined in (3.8) as P̄s = P̄r = 5. We consider two cases. In the first case,
we choose hs < 1, namely, we set hs = 0.75. In the second case, we choose hs > 1,
namely, hs = 1.25. For each case, we plot R̄
CJ and R̄NF versus the relative channel
gain hr. We observe that R̄
CJ = CGWT when hr ≤ max (1, hs) and R̄CJ > CGWT
otherwise. One can also see that limhr→∞ R̄
CJ(hr) = C
G where CG is the capacity
of the Gaussian channel between the source and the destination when no secrecy
constraint is imposed, i.e., when the eavesdropper is not present. On the other hand,





whereas R̄NF > CGWT
otherwise.
Next, we consider the multiple deaf helper case. Consider a disk of radius 1 km
where the source is located at the center, both the destination and the eavesdropper
are located at some fixed points on the circumference. Consider N relays whose
locations are chosen randomly and uniformly in this disk. Each channel gain is
generated according to the formula: γ = SV
dα
where γ is the channel gain, S is a
lognormal random variable to account for shadowing, and V is a Rayleigh random
variable for fading, d is the distance, and α is the path loss [45]. We assume that
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Figure 3.2: The optimal achievable rates R̄CJ and R̄NF as functions of hr, for two
cases of the hs.
the underlying Gaussian random variables from which S and V are generated are
independent, zero mean, and unit variance Gaussian random variables. We also take
α = 3. We set ρ̄s = 10 and ρ̄r = 1 ∀r ∈ N .
In Figure 3.3, we plot the achievable secrecy rate against the maximum allowed
number of helpers, K, for N = 25 and 50, in three different cases. In the first case, the
secrecy rate is obtained using the MDHS strategy described in the previous section.
In the second case, we only consider CJ as the only deaf cooperation mode, i.e., ignore
all the relays that could be useful noise forwarders and use the MDHS strategy only
for useful cooperative jammers. In the third case, we consider only NF as the only
mode available for deaf cooperation. It is clear from Figure 3.3 that making use of the
two modes (CJ/NF) together in the system could significantly increase the achievable
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Figure 3.3: The achievable secrecy rate, R∗, versus the maximum allowed number of
deaf helpers, K, for three cases: CJ/NF, NF only, and CJ only
secrecy rates. Also, we notice that one could benefit from considering a larger set of
relays, i.e., larger N , as this may lead to a better selected set of helpers.
In Figure 3.4 the achievable secrecy rate, R∗, is plotted against the maximum
allowed number of helpers, K, for three different realizations of the relays where
N = 50. It can be seen that the selected helpers could be cooperative jammers (CJ)
or noise forwarders (NF), or both, and that one can improve the achievable rate by
selecting more than one helper. One can also see that the number of selected helpers
could be less than K. Specifically, for the realizations considered here, the numbers
of selected helpers are 2, 4, and 6.
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Figure 3.4: The achievable secrecy rate versus the maximum allowed number of
helpers, K, for three realizations of relays locations, with N = 50.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we considered two modes of deaf cooperation for secrecy, CJ and
NF. We gave the necessary conditions for each of the two modes to yield higher
secrecy rates than the secrecy capacity of the original GWT channel. We also showed
that a node cannot be both useful jammer and noise forwarder at the same time.
Moreover, we derived the optimal power control policy that maximizes the secrecy rate
achieved by each of the two modes. For the deaf helper selection problem, we proposed
an optimal strategy to select a single deaf helper that maximizes the secrecy rate
achievable by deaf cooperation with a single helper. We also proposed a suboptimal
strategy for the selection of multiple deaf helpers to increase the achievable secrecy
rates. We discussed the complexity of the two proposed strategies and showed that
both of them are efficient. We gave numerical results to verify the derived conditions
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for a useful deaf cooperation. We also presented examples to compare our strategies
with those only based on one mode of cooperation. Also, through numerical examples,
we showed the improvement in the secrecy rate achieved when using multiple deaf
helpers instead of just one.
3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
First, we show that RCJ(Ps, Pr) ≥ CGWT (Ps) if and only if (3.12) or (3.13) holds. It
is easy to see that if any of (3.12) and (3.13) holds, then RCJ(Ps, Pr) ≥ CGWT (Ps).
Now, suppose that RCJ(Ps, Pr) ≥ CGWT (Ps), then from (3.9) and (5.8), we have





and RCJ(Ps, Pr) ≥ 0 which imply
(hshr − 1) + hs(hr − 1)Ps ≥ hr(1− hs)Pr (3.43)
hs − 1 ≤ (hr − hs)Pr (3.44)
Condition (3.44) implies hs ≤ max(1, hr). On the other hand, we cannot have
max(hr, hs) < 1 since this contradicts (3.43). By considering the remaining possi-
bilities, we either have
1 ≤ hs < hr (3.45)
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which directly implies (3.43), or we have
hs < 1 ≤ hr (3.46)
which directly implies (3.44). Thus, if RCJ(Ps, Pr) ≥ CGWT (Ps), then we either have
(3.43) and (3.46) satisfied together which is indeed condition (3.12), or we have (3.44)
and (3.45) satisfied together which is condition (3.13).
Now, we prove the second part of Theorem 3.1. Again, it is easy to verify that if
any of conditions (3.14)-(3.16) holds, then RNF (Ps, Pr) ≥ CGWT (Ps). Now, suppose








and RNF (Ps, Pr) ≥ 0 which imply
(hr − hs)Ps ≤ (1− hr) (3.47)
hrPr ≥ hs − 1 (3.48)
(1− hr)Pr ≥ (hs − 1)Ps (3.49)
Condition (3.49) implies that min(hs, hr) ≤ 1. On the other hand, we cannot have
hs ≤ 1 < hr since this contradicts (3.47). Now, we consider the three remaining
possible cases of relative channel gains. We either have
hr ≤ hs ≤ 1 (3.50)
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which directly implies all the conditions (3.47)-(3.49) above, or we have
hs < hr ≤ 1 (3.51)
which directly implies both conditions (3.48) and (3.49), or we have
hr < 1 ≤ hs (3.52)
which directly implies condition (3.47). Thus, if RNF (Ps, Pr) ≥ CGWT (Ps), we either
have condition (3.50) satisfied which is indeed condition (3.14), or we have conditions
(3.47) and (3.51) both satisfied which is the same as (3.15), or we have conditions
(3.48), (3.49), and (3.52) satisfied together which is the same as (3.16).
3.8.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
We define
fCJ(Ps, Pr) ,
(1 + Ps + Pr)(1 + hrPr)
(1 + hsPs + hrPr)(1 + Pr)
(3.53)
fNF1 (Ps, Pr) ,
(1 + Ps)(1 + hrPr)
(1 + hsPs + hrPr)
(3.54)
fNF2 (Ps, Pr) ,
(1 + Ps + Pr)





























We first consider the case where hr ≥ 1. Following Corollary 3.1, the NF strategy
is not useful in this case, hence, in this case if hs < 1 then P̂
NF
s = P̄s, P̂
NF
r = 0,
otherwise P̂NFs = P̄s, P̂
NF
r = 0. This proves (3.20) and (3.31). On the other hand,
if 1 ≤ hr ≤ hs, then again following Corollary 3.1, both strategies are useless and we
have P̂CJs = P̂
CJ




r = 0. This proves (3.35)-(3.36). The remaining
possible cases where hr ≥ 1 are hs < 1 ≤ hr and 1 ≤ hs < hr, i.e., cases 1-(a) and










(1− hs + (hr − hs)Pr)(1 + hrPr)





(hr(hs − hr)P 2r + 2hr(hs − 1)Pr + hs (hr(1 + Ps)− Ps)− 1)Ps
(1 + Pr)2(1 + hsPs + hrPr)2
(3.59)
We note that ∂f
CJ (Ps,Pr)
∂Ps
> 0, ∀Ps, Pr. Moreover, ∂f
CJ (Ps,Pr)
∂Pr
has two zeros, one of them




r is given by (3.37) which turns out to be the unconstrained





given by (3.19). Suppose now that 1 ≤ hs < hr. If P̄r ≤ hs−1hr−hs , then from condition
(3.13) in Theorem 3.1, we must have P̂CJs = P̂
CJ
r = 0 since hs ≥ 1. Otherwise,
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suppose that P̄r >
hs−1
hr−hs
. First, note that for all Ps,
∂fCJ (Ps,Pr)
∂Ps




On the other hand, ∂f
CJ (Ps,Pr)
∂Pr
has two zeros, one of them is the unconstrained global
maximizer of fCJ(Ps, Pr) with respect to Pr for any given Ps. Moreover, for all Ps,
this unconstrained global maximizer is greater than hs−1
hr−hs
. Noting that the value
of such unconstrained global maximizer at Ps = P̄s is P
∗









and P̂CJs = P̄s which proves (3.30).
Next, we consider then case where hr < 1. By Corollary 3.1, the CJ strategy
is not useful in this case, hence, in this case if hs < 1 then P̂
CJ
s = P̄s, P̂
CJ
r = 0,
otherwise, P̂CJs = P̂
CJ
r = 0. This proves (3.21), (3.25), and (3.32). The remaining
possible cases where hr < 1 are hs < hr < 1, hr ≤ hs < 1, and hr < 1 ≤ hs, i.e., cases
1-(b), 1-(c), and 2-(b) in Theorem 3.2. First, one can easily verify that








(1− hs + hrPr)











(1− hs + (hr − hs)Pr)





(1− hr + (hs − hr)Ps)
(1 + hsPs + hrPr)2
(3.64)






are positive for all Ps, Pr. Hence, we must have P̂
NF




> 0 is positive for all Ps, Pr while
∂fNF2 (Ps,Pr)
∂Pr




Hence, if P̄s <
1−hr
hr−hs
, then P̂NFr = P̄r. If P̄s ≥ 1−hrhr−hs , then from (3.60), (3.10),




, we must have P̂NFr = 0. This proves (3.22)-








positive for all Ps, Pr. Thus, both f
NF
1 (Ps, Pr) and f
NF
2 (Ps, Pr) are increasing in
Pr for any given value of Ps, hence their minimum is also increasing in Pr. Thus,









are both positive. Hence, P̂NFs = P̄s which proves (3.26). If P̄r ≥ 1−hshs−hr , then one
can verify that fNF1 (Ps, P̄r) is increasing in Ps while f
NF
2 (Ps, Pr) is decreasing in
Ps. Thus, the unconstrained global maximizer of their minimum is the point where
they are equal, i.e., Ps =
1−hr
hr







Finally, suppose that hr < 1 ≤ hs. If P̄r ≤ hs−1hr , then from condition (3.16) in
Theorem 3.1, we must have P̂NFs = P̂
NF










are positive for all Ps
and Pr. Thus, arguing as above, we conclude that P̂
NF
















Deaf Cooperation for Secrecy with a Multi-Antenna Helper
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we studied the notion of deaf cooperation and its applica-
tion in a single antenna relay-eavesdropper channel. In this chapter, we study the
application of this notion in a relay-eavesdropper channel with a multi-antenna relay.
Interestingly, this study reveals new ideas that were not valid in the single-antenna
relay case. This, in turn, leads to useful deaf cooperation strategies that exploit the
multiple spatial dimensions available in this channel to achieve higher secure rates.
Cooperative jamming strategies in multi-antenna relay networks were investigated
in [23], [26], and [25]. In [23], a cooperative jamming strategy is proposed when the
relay is equipped with multiple antennas. Under the constraint that the jamming
signals must lie in the subspace orthogonal to the channel vector between the relay
and the destination, [23] derives the antenna weights and transmit power of the source
and the relay that maximize the achievable secrecy rate subject to a total transmit
power constraint. In [26], two cooperative jamming strategies were proposed for a half-
duplex two-hop multi-antenna relay system where the eavesdropper’s channel state
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information was unknown. In the first strategy, jamming signals are only transmitted
by the nodes that are also transmitting data whereas in the second strategy, the
inactive nodes are used as cooperative jammers. In [25], a cooperative jamming
strategy is proposed for two-hop relay networks where the eavesdropper can wiretap
the transmission in both hops. In the model in [25], the source, the destination, and
the eavesdropper have multiple antennas, whereas the relay has a single antenna.
Under similar constraint to the one in [23], namely, that the jamming signals lie in
the subspace orthogonal to the channels to the legitimate nodes, closed-form solutions
were derived for jamming beamformers that maximize the achievable secrecy rate, and
the optimal power allocation was obtained using numerical methods.
In all the references above, the role of a helping node was restricted to one mode of
deaf cooperation, namely, cooperative jamming. However, as discussed in Chapter 3,
a helping node can also improve secrecy without listening to the source by using the
noise forwarding strategy which was introduced in [29] for the single antenna relay-
eavesdropper channel. In this chapter, we introduce new strategies based on both
CJ and NF modes of deaf cooperation. In particular, we show that having multiple
antennas allows us to decompose the relay-eavesdropper channel into two orthogonal
components, one in the direction of the relay-destination channel (direct component)
and the other in the orthogonal direction to the relay-destination channel (orthogonal
component). Accordingly, we obtain the optimal deaf cooperation strategy (CJ or
NF) along each channel component. It is intuitive that the orthogonal component
should be used for cooperative jamming. However, it is not clear what strategy should
be used along the direct component. It is not also clear how the relay should distribute
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its power over these two orthogonal directions.
In this chapter, we fully answer these two questions. We give, in terms of the model
fixed parameters, the necessary conditions for each of the CJ and the NF strategy
to be useful when employed along the direct component, i.e., to improve over the
optimal secrecy rate achievable when the transmission from the relay is constrained
only to the orthogonal component. In particular, our results show that along the
direct component of the channel either CJ is useful or NF is useful but not both.
Moreover, there are some cases (which are described in this chapter) in which neither
CJ nor NF is useful along the direct component. We fully characterize in the closed-
form the optimal power allocation policy at the source and the relay for each of the
two strategies and hence show how the relay should optimally distribute its power on
the two channel components.
Next, we turn our attention to a certain class of the multi-antenna relay-eavesdropper
channels, namely, the reversely degraded channel. We show that the strategy in which
the relay jams with full power along the orthogonal component of the channel and
transmits nothing in the direct component is optimal when the relay’s average power
goes to infinity. In fact, we even prove a stronger result. The secrecy rate achieved
by this strategy approaches the capacity of the reversely degraded multi-antenna re-
lay channel as the relay’s average power increases, and hence this strategy achieves
the optimal secure degrees of freedom (DoF) of the reversely degraded multi-antenna
relay-eavesdropper channel. Interestingly, this strategy is clearly suboptimal in gen-
eral for a bounded relay’s power. Moreover, we show that this result is valid with
probability 1 even when the relay-eavesdropper’s channel state information is unavail-
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able.
Finally, we present numerical examples to illustrate the gains in the achievable
secrecy rates by our CJ and NF strategies when the relay is equipped with multi-
ple antennas. Our simulation results clearly show that the rates achievable by our
strategies are, in general, significantly larger than those achieved when no splitting
of power between CJ and NF is allowed.
4.2 System Model
We consider the following communication scenario. A single-antenna source, s, sends
a confidential message to a single-antenna destination, d, over an AWGN channel in
the presence of an informed eavesdropper, e, that also has a single antenna. The
communication also occurs in the presence of a helper node, r, that is equipped with
K antennas, K ≥ 1. The helper node r is assumed to be a deaf relay, i.e., it can only
help improving the secrecy capacity of the GWT by transmitting interfering signals
that are independent of the source message. In the literature, there are two proposed
strategies for useful interference introduced by a helper node [34], [19], and [29]. In the
first strategy, known as cooperative jamming, one allows r to help by transmitting
pure Gaussian noise whereas in the second strategy, known as noise forwarding, r
sends a dummy codeword from a codebook known to both the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper. By proper scaling of the channel inputs and accordingly modifying
the power constraints at the source and the helper nodes, without loss of generality,
one can express the outputs of the GWT channel, with a multi-antenna deaf helper,
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at the destination and the eavesdropper as
Y = Xs + h
T







where hr ∈ RK is the vector of the channel coefficients between the helper r and the
destination d, gs ∈ R, gr ∈ RK are the channel coefficient scalar and the channel
coefficient vector from the source s and the helper r to the eavesdropper, respectively,
and, N and N ′ are standard Gaussian random variables that denote the noise at the
destination and the eavesdropper, respectively, Xs ∈ R, Xr ∈ RK are the channel
input scalar and the channel input vector at the source s and the helper r, respectively.
The channel inputs are subjected to the following average power constraints:
E[|Xs|2] ≤ P̄s, and E[‖ Xr ‖2] ≤ P̄r (4.3)
By possibly writing gr as the direct sum gr =
√
αhr + ur where h
T
r ur = 0,
one can write Xr in (4.1)-(4.2) as the sum of two orthogonal components. That is,
Xr = Xr0 +Xr1 where











where γr0 =‖ hr ‖2 and γr1 =‖ ur ‖2. Thus, we can write (4.1)-(4.2) as
Y = Xs + h
T









Note that Xr0 and Xr1 in (4.4) and (4.5), respectively, can be arbitrarily correlated.
Note also that it is of no loss of generality writing gr =
√
αhr + ur rather than
gr = ±
√
αhr + ur since the sign of
√
α is irrelevant when it comes to expressions of
the achievable secrecy rates. We call Xr0 the direct component of the helper’s signal
since it is in the same direction as the channel component hr from the helper to the
destination while we call Xr1 the orthogonal component of the helper’s signal since











. We also define Qr0 , E [X
2
r0] and Qr1 , E [X
2
r1]. Hence, from






where tr(A) denotes the trace of








Now, we consider the possible signalling Xr0 and Xr1 across the two orthogonal
directions using either one of the two signalling strategies CJ or NF in every direction.
Clearly, it would not be beneficial if the NF strategy was used for the orthogonal
component Xr1 (i.e., in the direction ur orthogonal to the helper-destination channel
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hr) since the destination cannot decode Xr1 as it lies in the null space of its observed
signal space. On the other hand, if the CJ strategy is used for Xr1, the eavesdropper
is the only one who is possibly harmed by the resulting noise, not the destination.
Hence, we assume that the helper will use the orthogonal component Xr1 for CJ.
That is, Xr1 is given by (4.5) where Xr1 is a Gaussian random variable with zero
mean and variance Qr0. We consequently distinguish between two possible strategies
depending on whether the helper uses the direct component Xr0 for CJ or NF. In
both strategies, the channel input at the source Xs is a symbol of the codeword
that represents the encoded confidential message. Such codeword is drawn from an
i.i.d. Gaussian codebook, i.e., Xs is a Gaussian random variable with zero mean and
variance Ps where Ps ≤ P̄s. Also, in both strategies, the direct component of the
channel input at the helper Xr0 is given by (4.4) where Xr0 is a Gaussian random
variable with zero mean and variance Qr1. Moreover, Xr0 can be arbitrarily correlated
to Xr1 and hence Xr1 can be written as
Xr1 = X̃r1 + ρXr0 (4.9)
where X̃r1 is a Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance Q̃r1 and is











Q̃r1 ≤ P̄r (4.10)
The difference between the two strategies comes from the origin of Xr0. In the
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CJ strategy, Xr0 is Gaussian random variable that plays the role of background noise
at both the destination and the eavesdropper except for the fact that it is generated
artificially. On the other hand, in the NF strategy, Xr0 is a symbol of a dummy
(context-free) codeword drawn from an i.i.d. Gaussian codebook that is assumed to
be available at both the destination and the eavesdropper. Hence, we note that in the
NF strategy, it is no loss of optimality to take the two orthogonal components Xr0
and Xr1 to be independent since the Gaussian noise Xr1 in the orthogonal component
must not reveal any information about the codeword symbol Xr0. Hence, in this case,
we set ρ in (4.9) and (4.10) to zero. In the CJ strategy, this is not generally the
case. However, finding the optimal power control policy, i.e., the optimal values of
Ps, Qr0, Qr1, and ρ that maximizes the achievable secrecy rate by the CJ strategy
subject to the first constraint in (4.3) and constraint (4.10) becomes analytically
intractable. Hence, to obtain closed-form expressions for the power control policy
of the CJ strategy, we will take both Xr0 and Xr1 to be independent, i.e., we set
ρ = 0. From this point on, we will assume that the two components Xr0 and Xr1 are
independent.
If Xr0 is used for CJ, the achievable secrecy rate, denoted as R
CJ , is given by





(1 + Ps +Qr0) (1 + αQr0 +Qr1)
(1 + gsPs + αQr0 +Qr1) (1 +Qr0)
)
(4.11)
On the other hand, if Xr0 is used for NF, the achievable secrecy rate, denoted as
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RNF , is given by






(1 + Ps) (1 + αQr0 +Qr1)







(1 + Ps +Qr0) (1 +Qr1)




where, in (4.11)-(4.12), Ps, Qr0, and Qr1 satisfy the first constraint in (4.3) and con-
straint (4.8). For the sake of comparison, when there is no relay involved, the secrecy











where (x)+ = max(0, x).
4.3 Maximizing the Secrecy Rates Achievable by Deaf Cooperation
4.3.1 The CJ strategy
We consider the following optimization problem:
max
Ps,Qr0,Qr1
RCJ(Ps, Qr0, Qr1) (4.14)













(1 + αQr0 +Qr1)(1 + gsPs + αQr0 +Qr1)
> 0 (4.17)
Thus, from (4.16), it is no loss of optimality to set












(1 + Ps +Qr0)(1 + α̃Qr0)
(1 + g̃sPs + α̃Qr0)(1 +Qr0)
)
(4.19)
s.t. 0 ≤ Ps ≤ P̄s (4.20)











Again, for the sake of comparison, let Ro denote the optimal secrecy rate achievable
when no transmission is carried out along the direct component of the channel, i.e.,
when the transmission is constrained only to the orthogonal component of the channel.
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Note that the optimization problem (4.19)-(4.21) may look similar to the one
considered in Chapter 3 for the single-antenna case. However, a notable difference
is that α̃ could be positive or negative depending on the relative values of γr0 and
γr1. In particular, α̃ ≥ 0 if and only if γr0 ≥ γr1, i.e., the magnitude of the direct
component is greater than that of the orthogonal component.
Let (P̂CJs , Q̂
CJ
r0 ) be the maximizer of (4.19) subject to (4.20)-(4.21). Note that,
once Q̂CJr0 is derived, the optimal value of Qr1, denoted as Q̂
CJ
r1 , can be easily found
from (4.18) where Qr0 is set to Q̂
CJ















. In the next theorem, we fully derive the optimal
power control policy (P̂CJs , Q̂
CJ
r0 ) for maximizing R
CJ .
Theorem 4.1 The optimal policy (P̂CJs , Q̂
CJ
r0 ) is given as follows:
1. If α̃ ≤ 0: In this case, we have
P̂CJs = P̄s, if g̃s < 1 (4.25)
P̂CJs = 0, if g̃s ≥ 1 (4.26)
Q̂CJr0 = 0 (4.27)
2. If α̃ > 0: We have four possibilities depending on the relative values of α̃ and
g̃s:
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(a) If g̃s ≥ max (1, α̃), then
P̂CJs = 0 (4.28)
Q̂CJr0 = 0 (4.29)
(b) If g̃s < 1 ≤ α̃, then










(c) If 1 ≤ g̃s < α̃, then
P̂CJs = 0, Q̂
CJ
















(d) If max(g̃s, α̃) < 1, then
P̂CJs = P̄s (4.34)







g̃s (α̃− g̃s) P̄s + g̃s (α̃− 1)
)




and, for x ∈ R, (x)+ is defined as max(0, x).







α̃(g̃s − α̃)Qr02 + 2Qr0(g̃s − 1)α̃ + g̃s(α̃− 1)Ps + g̃sα̃− 1
(1 +Qr0)(1 + g̃sPs + α̃Qr0)(1 + Ps +Qr0)(1 + α̃Qr0)
Ps (4.37)
It is easy to see that if α̃ ≤ 0, then ∂RCJ (Ps,Qr0)
∂Qr0
< 0 ∀Ps, Qr0. Hence, Q̂CJr0 = 0 and
case 1 follows. On the other hand, case 2 of this theorem is exactly the same as the
case of single antenna relay given by Theorem 3.2. 2
Theorem 4.1 tells us that CJ along the direct component can be useful only when
the magnitude of the direct component of gr is larger than that of the orthogonal
component, i.e., when α̃ > 0. Otherwise, the optimal power allocation strategy at the
multiple antenna deaf helper would be to jam only along the orthogonal component
and transmit nothing along the direct component.
4.3.2 The NF strategy
Here, we consider the following optimization problem
max
Ps,Qr0,Qr1
RNF (Ps, Qr0, Qr1) (4.38)








where RNF (Ps, Qr0, Qr1) is given by (4.12). We define





(1 + Ps)(1 + αQr0 +Qr1)
1 + gsPs + αQr0 +Qr1
)
(4.41)





(1 + Ps +Qr0)(1 +Qr1)




RNF (Ps, Qr0, Qr1) = min
(
RNF1 (Ps, Qr0, Qr1), R
NF








(1 + αQr0 +Qr1)(1 + gsPs + αQr0 +Qr1)
> 0 (4.44)




(1 +Qr1)(1 + gsPs + αQr0 +Qr1)
> 0 (4.45)
It follows that ∂R
NF (Ps,Qr0,Qr1)
∂Qr1
> 0. Thus, from (4.40), again as in (4.18), it is no loss
of optimality to set Qr1 = γr1P̄r − γr1γr0Qr0 in (4.38). Hence, the optimization problem
given by (4.38)-(4.40) reduces to
max
Ps,Qr0
RNF (Ps, Qr0) , min
(





s.t. 0 ≤ Ps ≤ P̄s (4.47)
0 ≤ Qr0 ≤ γr0P̄r (4.48)
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where





(1 + Ps)(1 + α̃Qr0)
1 + g̃sPs + α̃Qr0
)
(4.49)





(1 + Ps +Qr0)(1− βQr0)
1 + g̃sPs + α̃Qr0
)
(4.50)





As in the previous subsection, note that the optimal secrecy rate Ro achievable when
the transmission at the relay is constrained to the orthogonal channel component is
given by (4.24).
There are two main differences between the achievable secrecy rate given by (4.46)
and the achievable secrecy rate by the NF strategy when the helper has a single
antenna. The first difference is, as stated above, α̃ can take a positive or negative
value depending on the relative values of γr0 and γr1, i.e., the magnitudes of the
direct and orthogonal components of the helper-eavesdropper channel. The second
difference is the factor (1− βQr0) in RNF2 given by (4.50).
Let (P̂NFs , Q̂
NF
r0 ) be the maximizer of (4.46) subject to (4.47)-(4.48). As discussed
above, once Q̂NFr0 is derived, the optimal value of Qr1, denoted as Q̂
NF
r1 , can be easily
found from (4.18) where Qr0 is set to Q̂
NF
r0 . The optimal covariance matrices Q̂
NF
r0












. Before we give the optimal power
control policy (P̂NFs , Q̂
NF
r0 ), we first give the following useful lemmas.
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Lemma 4.1 A necessary condition for the NF strategy to be useful along the direct
component of the channel is to have α̃ ≥ 0 and α̃ + β < 1.









= Ro which is indeed the secrecy rate achievable
when the transmission at the relay is constrained to the orthogonal component of the
channel. On the other hand, suppose that α̃+ β > 1. Now, if g̃s < 1, then we clearly












for all Ps, Qr0 ≥ 0. If g̃s > 1,
then RNF2 (Ps, Qr0) ≤ 0 for all Ps, Qr0 ≥ 0. Thus, we have RNF (Ps, Qr0) ≤ Ro for all
Ps, Qr0 ≥ 0. 2
Lemma 4.2 Let φ , g̃sβPs
2 +(α̃+ β− g̃s)Ps − (1− α̃− β) and ψ , (α̃ + β − g̃s)2 −
4g̃sβ (α̃ + β − 1). If the conditions of Lemma 1 hold, i.e., if
α̃ ≥ 0, α̃ + β < 1 (4.52)
then, for any fixed Ps where
0 ≤ Ps ≤ P ∗s ,
√






≥ 0 if and only if
0 ≤ Qr0 ≤ Q∗r0(Ps) ,
√




Consequently, if conditions (4.52)-(4.53) hold, then
RNF2 (Ps, Qr0) ≤ RNF2 (Ps, Q∗r0(Ps)) (4.55)
Proof: Define fNF2 (Ps, Qr0) as the numerator of
∂RNF2 (Ps,Qr0)
∂Qr0
. Note that the sign of
∂RNF2 (Ps,Qr0)
∂Qr0
is the same as the sign of fNF2 (Ps, Qr0) for all Ps, Qr0 ≥ 0. It is easy to
verify that fNF2 (Ps, Qr0) is given by
fNF2 (Ps, Qr0) =− α̃βQr02 − 2β(1 + g̃sPs)Qr0 − φ (4.56)
Fix Ps and let q1(Ps), q2(Ps) denote the two roots of f
NF
2 (Ps, Qr0). Since α̃ ≥ 0, then
∂RNF2 (Ps,Qr0)
∂Qr0
≥ 0 if and only if Qr0 ∈ [q1(Ps), q2(Ps)]. However, it is not hard to see





if and only if Qr0 ∈ [0, q2(Ps)] where q2(Ps) = Q∗r0(Ps) where Q∗r0 is given in (4.54).
Thus, it remains to show that Q∗r0(Ps) ≥ 0 (and hence [0, Q∗r0(Ps)] is not empty)
whenever 0 ≤ Ps ≤ P ∗s where P ∗s is given in (4.53). We note that Q∗r0(Ps) ≥ 0 if and
only if φ ≤ 0. Since φ is quadratic in Ps, it is not hard to see that φ ≤ 0 whenever Ps
lies between the two roots of φ. However, one of the roots is negative and the other
is positive due to the fact that α̃ + β < 1. Indeed, the positive root is P ∗s . Hence,
φ < 0 and consequently Q∗r0(Ps) > 0 whenever 0 ≤ Ps ≤ P ∗s . 2
In the next theorem, we fully derive the optimal power policy (P̂NFs , Q̂
NF
r0 ) for
maximizing RNF . A proof of this theorem is given in the Appendix.
Theorem 4.2 Let Q̃r0 be the value of Qr0 such that R
NF


















r0 ) is given as follows:
1. If α̃ ≤ 0: In this case, we have
P̂NFs = P̄s, if g̃s < 1 (4.58)
P̂NFs = 0, if g̃s ≥ 1 (4.59)
Q̂NFr0 = 0 (4.60)
2. If α̃ > 0: We have the following four possibilities depending on the values of
α̃, g̃s, and β:
(a) If α̃ + β ≥ 1, then
P̂NFs = P̄s, if g̃s < 1 (4.61)
P̂NFs = 0, if g̃s ≥ 1 (4.62)
Q̂NFr0 = 0 (4.63)
(b) If g̃s ≤ α̃ < 1− β, then





















, if P̄s ≤ P ∗s




(c) If α̃ < min (1− β, g̃s) < 1, then
i. If γr0P̄r ≤ 1−g̃sg̃s−α̃ , then




















, if P̄s ≤ P ∗s

















































































(a) are the optimal values P̂NFs , Q̂
NF
r0 , respectively, of
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case 2(c-ii) above, i.e.,
Ps























, if P̄s ≤ P ∗s


























1− (α̃ + β) +√α̃β −
√
(α̃ + β) ((α̃ + β)− g̃sβ) g̃s (1− α̃)
)
√
α̃β (g̃sβ − α̃ (α̃ + β))
(4.73)





























, if P̄s ≤ P ∗s











P̂NFs = P̄s (4.76)
Q̂NFr0 = γr0P̄r (4.77)
(d) If α̃ < 1− β ≤ 1 ≤ g̃s, then
i. If γr0P̄r ≤ g̃s−1α̃ , then
P̂NFs = Q̂
NF
r0 = 0 (4.78)

































r0 is given by (4.73).

















P̂NFs = P̄s (4.82)
Q̂NFr0 = γr0P̄r (4.83)
4.3.3 CJ versus NF
In the next corollary, we use the results of the above two theorems to compare the two
strategies. In particular, we show in terms of the parameters of the deaf cooperation
model when it is better to use CJ than NF for transmission along the direct component
Xr0 and vice versa. We also give the conditions for which both CJ and NF along the
direct component are useless.
Corollary 4.1 Let α̃, g̃s, and β be as defined in (4.22), (4.23), and (4.51), respec-
tively. For the CJ along the direct channel component to be useful, it is necessary to
have α̃ > max(1, g̃s). Whereas, for the NF along the direct channel component to be














> Ro then 0 < α̃ < 1− β (4.85)
Hence, if
α̃ ∈ [1− β,max(1, g̃s)] ∪ (−∞, 0] , (4.86)
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neither CJ nor NF along the direct component is useful, i.e., Q̂CJr0 = Q̂
NF
r0 = 0.




s = P̄s and Q̂r1 = γr1P̄r,
i.e., the optimal power strategy at the relay in this case is to jam with full power along
the orthogonal component and transmit nothing along the direct component. Whereas,
if, in addition to (4.86), g̃s ≥ 1, then P̂CJs = P̂NFs = Q̂r1 = 0, i.e., no transmission
occurs at all and hence the achievable secrecy rate is zero in this case.
4.4 The Reversely Degraded Relay-Eavesdropper Channel with a Multi-
Antenna Relay
In this section, we consider a similar model to the one described in Section 4.2 except
for two differences. First, we assume that the relay receives a vector Yr which is a
noisy version of the source transmission and hence the relay can use this observation
in one way or another to help increase the achievable secrecy rate. Second, we as-
sume that, given the relay’s channel input Xr, the relay’s observation is a degraded
version of the destination’s observation. In particular, we consider the system where
the destination’s and the eavesdropper’s observations are given by (4.6) and (4.7),
respectively. The relay’s observation, Yr ∈ RK , is given by
Yr = ηY +ΘXr +Nr (4.87)
where η ∈ RK is the vector of equivalent channel coefficients from the destination’s
observation Y to the relay’s observation Yr, Θ ∈ RK×K is the matrix of channel
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coefficients from the relay’s input Xr to the relay’s output Yr, and Nr ∈ RK is
AWGN vector of zero mean and identity covariance matrix and is independent of
(Xs, Xr, N, N
′). Accordingly, we have the following Markov chain Xs → (Y,Xr) →
Yr. We further assume that in (4.7) ur 6= 0, i.e., given the source’s input Xs, neither
the destination’s observation Y nor the eavesdropper’s observation Z is a degraded
version of one another.
In the following theorem, we show that for the channel described in this section,
using only the CJ strategy over the orthogonal component Xr1 (no signaling over the
direct component Xr0) yields a secrecy rate that approaches the secrecy capacity of
this channel as P̄r → ∞. In other words, we show that for high SNR over the relay-
destination and the relay-eavesdropper channel, the secrecy rate achieved by CJ over
the orthogonal component of the relay-eavesdropper channel (and no signaling over
the direct component) approaches the secrecy capacity of the channel described above,
i.e., this strategy achieves the optimal secure DoF of such channel.
Theorem 4.3 Let Cs(P̄r) be the secrecy capacity of the reversely degraded relay-
eavesdropper channel given by (4.6), (4.7), and (4.87) for a given value of the relay’s
average power constraint P̄r. Suppose that ur 6= 0. Let Ro(P̄r) be Ro of (4.24) written
as a function of P̄r, i.e., Ro(P̄r) denote the secrecy rate achievable by using the total
source’s power P̄s for information transmission and using the total relay’s power P̄r
for CJ along the orthogonal component of the relay-eavesdropper channel (i.e., set-
ting Ps = P̄s, Qr1 = γr1P̄r and Qr0 = 0 in any one of the two strategies described in
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Section 4.3). Then, for every ε > 0, there is a sufficiently large value P̄r such that












is the capacity of the Gaussian channel between the source
and the destination when there is no eavesdropper in the system.
In Theorem 4.3, one should note that CG is indeed an upper bound on the secrecy
capacity of the reversely degraded relay-eavesdropper channel. This is due to the
fact that the relay in this case cannot increase the reliable information rate from the
source to the destination and hence the capacity of the relay channel with no secrecy
constraints is indeed CG. Therefore, CG is an upper bound on the secrecy capacity
















Hence, (4.89) follows. This indeed proves (4.88).
We can even make a stronger statement than the one Theorem 4.3. In fact,
if the relay-eavesdropper channel gr is unknown at all the nodes (except possibly
the eavesdropper itself), we let the relay choose at random a signaling direction
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for jamming in the subspace orthogonal to hr, i.e., chooses a unit vector sr ∈ RK
at random and chooses the covariance matrix Q of Xr as srs
T
r P̄r. In this case,
conditioned on some choice of sr, the achievable secrecy rate by this strategy, as












1 + gTr srP̄r + gsP̄s
1 + gTr srP̄r
)
(4.91)
It is clear that gTr sr 6= 0 with probability 1. Hence, Ro(P̄r) → CG almost surely as
P̄r → ∞. Thus, even if the relay-eavesdropper’s channel gr is unknown, the result
of Theorem 4.3 would still hold with probability 1. This stronger result is stated
formally in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4 If the relay-eavesdropper’s channel information gr is unavailable (ex-
cept possibly at the eavesdropper), then using a simple randomized version of the
relay’s strategy given in Theorem 4.3, the achievable secrecy rate Ro(P̄r) converges to
CG as P̄r → ∞ with probability 1 where CG is the capacity of the Gaussian channel
between the source and the destination when there is no eavesdropper in the system.
Hence, with probability 1, Ro(P̄r) approaches the secrecy of the reversely degraded
relay-eavesdropper channel with multiple antennas at the relay as the total average
relay’s power P̄r becomes sufficiently large.
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4.5 Numerical Results
First, consider the system described in Section 4.2. We compare the optimal secrecy
rates RCJ and RNF achievable by our CJ and NF strategies proposed in Section 4.3
with the optimal secrecy rate Ro achievable by the strategy that uses only the orthog-
onal component of the channel for CJ. We also compare these rates to the secrecy
capacity CGWT of the original Gaussian wiretap channel with no relay. In Figure 4.1,
we set P̄s = 5, P̄r = 2, gs = 0.85, γr0 = 2, and γr1 = 1. We plot R
CJ , RNF , Ro,
and CGWT versus
√
α, 0 ≤ √α ≤ 4, where, as in Section 4.2, √α is defined as gTr hr
γr0
.
It is clear from Figure 4.1 that the necessary conditions given in Corollary 4.1 for
RCJ > Ro and R
NF > Ro are satisfied here. Note that the necessary condition in
Corollary 4.1 for RCJ > Ro is equivalent to α >
γr1
γr0
+max(gs, 1+ γr1P̄r), i.e., α > 3.5
(or equivalently,
√
α > 1.871). Note also that the necessary condition in Corollary 4.1
for RNF > Ro is equivalent to
γr1
γr0
< α < 1 + γr1P̄r, i.e., 0.5 < α < 3 (or equivalently,
0.707 <
√
α < 1.732). It is clear that, in general, our CJ and NF strategy yield
greater secrecy rates than Ro and C
GWT .
Next, we consider the case where the relay is constrained to using only one of the
two modes (CJ or NF) over all the channel components, i.e., the relay cannot split
its power between CJ and NF. We denote the secrecy rate achievable in this case by
either RSM−CJ or RSM−NF depending on the single mode of deaf cooperation that
the relay is using. It is clear that RSM−CJ = RCJ where RCJ is the optimal secrecy
rate achieved by our CJ strategy since in this strategy the relay jams over the two
orthogonal components of the channel and hence it is indeed a single-mode strategy.
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Figure 4.1: The optimal achievable secrecy rates RCJ and RNF , the achievable secrecy





However, in our NF strategy the relay uses the orthogonal component for CJ whereas
it uses the direct component for NF. Therefore, intuitively, we must have RNF >
RSM−NF in general. To illustrate this, in Figure 4.2, we plotRNF , RSM−CJ , RNF−SM ,
and CGWT versus
√
α, 0 ≤ √α ≤ 2. The values of P̄s, P̄r, gs, γr0, and γr1 are fixed
and chosen as in the previous example.
Finally, we consider a reversely degraded relay-eavesdropper channel with multiple
antennas at the relay as the one described in Section 4.4. In Figure 4.3, we illustrate
the result of Theorem 4.3. We fix P̄s = 5, γr1 = 1. We plot the achievable secrecy
rate Ro of Theorem 4.3 as a function of P̄r for three different values of the channel
gain gs, namely, gs = 0.25, 0.75, and 1.5. In this example, the capacity of the
Gaussian channel between the source and the destination without secrecy constraints
is CG = 1
2
log(1+P̄s) = 1.292 bits/channel use. It is clear from Figure 4.3 that Ro(P̄r)
converges to CG as P̄r increases and the rate of convergence increases as gs decreases.
127
õ õ ö ù õ ö û õ ö ü õ ö þ ø ø ö ù ø ö û ø ö ü ø ö þ ùõõ ö øõ ö ù
õ ö úõ ö ûõ ö ÷õ ö ü
õ ö ýõ ö þ
α




	       !   "     !     
Figure 4.2: The optimal achievable secrecy rates RNF , RSM−CJ , RSM−NF , and the
secrecy capacity of the original Gaussian wiretap channel, CGWT , as functions of
√
α.
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Figure 4.3: Ro as a function of P̄r, C
G, and CGWT .
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we extended the idea of deaf cooperation to the multi-antenna deaf
helper model. We showed that the multiple spatial dimensions available in this model
can be exploited in the deaf cooperation paradigm by possibly decomposing the relay-
128
eavesdropper channel into two components, a direct component in the direction of
the relay-destination channel and an orthogonal component that is orthogonal to the
relay-destination channel. We proposed two strategies for deaf cooperation in this
model. In one strategy, the direct component is used by the relay to perform noise
forwarding whereas in the other strategy, it is used for cooperative jamming. In both
strategies, the orthogonal component is used for cooperative jamming. Under the
assumption of independent signaling along each component, we derived the optimal
power allocation for each strategy. We also found the necessary conditions for each
strategy to be useful, i.e., to achieve secrecy rate higher than the secrecy capacity
of the original Gaussian wiretap channel and showed that both strategies cannot be
useful at the same time. Finally, we considered the reversely degraded relay channel
and showed that by using a simple cooperative jamming strategy, we can approach
the secrecy capacity of this reversely degraded channel as the relay’s total power
increases.
4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2
For cases 1 and 2(a), the proof of these cases follows easily from Lemma 1. Before
we prove the rest of the cases, by simple computations, one can easily see that the
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conditions below hold for the rest of the cases, i.e., whenever α̃ > 0 and α̃ + β < 1.
∀ Ps ≥ 0,
∂RNF1 (Ps, Qr0)
∂Ps




∀ Ps ≥ 0,
∂RNF1 (Ps, Qr0)
∂Qr0
≥ 0 ∀ Qr0 ≥ 0 (4.93)
If g̃s < α̃, then ∀ Ps ≥ 0,
∂RNF2 (Ps, Qr0)
∂Ps




If g̃s > α̃, then ∀ Ps ≥ 0,
∂RNF2 (Ps, Qr0)
∂Ps




If g̃s = α̃, then ∀ Ps ≥ 0,
∂RNF2 (Ps, Qr0)
∂Ps
≥ 0 ∀ Qr0 ≥ 0 (4.96)
Also, from Lemma 1, we have
∀ Ps ∈ [0, P ∗s ],
∂RNF2 (Ps, Qr0)
∂Qr0
≥ 0 if and only if Qr0 ∈ [0, Q∗r0(Ps)] (4.97)
Now, we consider case 2(b). From (4.92) and (4.94), both RNF1 and R
NF
2 are in-
creasing in Ps. Hence, P̂
NF
s = P̄s. We have one of the following two cases depending
on whether P̄s ≤ P ∗s . First, if P̄s ≤ P ∗s , then it follows from (4.97) that, RNF2 (P̄s, Qr0),
as a function of Qr0, attains its unconstrained maximum at Qr0 = Q
∗
r0(P̄s). On the
other hand, from (4.92), RNF1 (P̄s, Qr0), as a function of Qr0, is increasing in Qr0 for
all Qr0 ≥ 0 and hence the curves of RNF1 (P̄s, Qr0) and RNF2 (P̄s, Qr0) may intersect
at some positive Qr0 (note that they already intersect at Qr0 = 0). It is easy to
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see that such point is indeed Q̃r0 given by (4.57). Note also that R
NF (P̄s, Qr0) =
RNF1 (P̄s, Qr0) whenever Qr0 ≤ Q̃r0, i.e., RNF1 (P̄s, Qr0) ≤ RNF2 (P̄s, Qr0) whenever





. Since both RNF1 (P̄s, Qr0) and R
NF
2 (P̄s, Qr0) are increasing in




, it follows that the constrained maximizer






. If P̄s > P
∗
s , then from (4.97),
RNF2 (P̄s, Qr0) (and consequently R
NF (P̄s, Qr0)) is upper bounded by R
NF
2 (P̄s, 0) = Ro
which is the optimal secrecy rate achieved when there is no transmission along the
direct channel component. Hence, Q̂NFr0 = 0.
Next, we consider case 2(c). From (4.92), RNF1 (Ps, Qr0) is increasing in Ps for all
Ps, Qr0 ≥ 0. In case 2(c-i), from (4.95), RNF2 (Ps, Qr0) is also increasing in Ps for all
Ps ≥ 0 and for all 0 ≤ Qr0 ≤ γr0P̄r. Hence, in this case P̂NFs = P̄s. The rest of
case 2(c-i) follows using the same argument of case 2(b).




, we solve the optimization problem in two steps. First, we find the local
maximizer (Ps
(a), Qr0
(a)) of RNF (Ps, Qr0) for 0 ≤ Ps ≤ P̄s, 0 ≤ Qr0 ≤ 1−g̃sg̃s−α̃ . Then,
we find the local maximizer (Ps
(b), Qr0
(b)) of RNF (Ps, Qr0) for 0 ≤ PsP̄s, 1−g̃sg̃s−α̃ ≤
Qr0 ≤ γr0P̄r. Finally, we set (P̂NFs , Q̂NFr0 ) = (Ps(a), Qr0(a)) if RNF (Ps(a), Qr0(a)) ≥
RNF (Ps
(b), Qr0
(b)) and set (P̂NFs , Q̂
NF





(a)) can be easily obtained in the same way the maximizer in
case 2(c-i) was obtained. In particular, Ps










if P̄s ≤ P ∗s whereas Qr0(a) = 0 if P̄s > P ∗s . We
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consider now the case where
1− g̃s
g̃s − α̃
≤ Qr0 ≤ γr0P̄r (4.98)
From (4.92) and (4.95), it follows that, for all Qr0 satisfying (4.98), R
NF
1 (Ps, Qr0) is
increasing in Ps whereas R
NF
2 (Ps, Qr0) is decreasing in Ps. Let P̃s(Qr0) be the value
of Ps such that R
NF
1 (Ps, Qr0) = R
NF






It follows from (4.99) that in order to have RNF1 (Ps, Qr0) = R
NF
2 (Ps, Qr0) for some
Ps ∈ [0, P̄s], we must have
1− (α̃ + β)(1 + P̄s)
β
≤Qr0 ≤
1− (α̃ + β)
β
(4.100)
Now, consider the maximizer of





(1 + α̃Qr0)(1− βQr0)













1− (α̃ + β)(1 + P̄s)
β
,




















It is not hard to check that RNF (P̃s(Qr0), Qr0) has one unconstrained maximum




r0 is given by (4.73). Hence, if the interval in (4.102) is





































, thenRNF2 (Ps, Qr0) ≤






. Hence, the choice of (Ps
(b), Qr0
(b)) is





> γr0P̄r, then R
NF
1 (Ps, Qr0) < R
NF





. Hence, RNF (Ps, Qr0) = R
NF





. Thus, it follows from (4.92) and (4.93) that the maximizer of RNF
is given by (P̄s, γr0P̄r).
Finally, we consider case 2(d). To prove the statement in case 2(d-i), we note that




Hence, if γr0P̄r ≤ g̃s−1α̃ , then we necessarily have RNF (Ps, Qr0) = 0 for all Ps ≥ 0
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and all 0 ≤ Qr0 ≤ γr0P̄r. Thus, in this case, P̂NFs = Q̂NFr0 = 0. For the rest of the




Decode-and-Forward Based Strategies for Secrecy in
Multiple Relay Networks
5.1 Introduction
In Chapters 3 and 4, we studied the notion of deaf cooperation in wireless relay net-
works with secrecy constraints. In this chapter, we turn our attention to the second
type of cooperation, namely, to active cooperation. In general, one can distinguish
between two types of cooperation in the secrecy context. The first type of cooper-
ation for secrecy is passive (deaf) cooperation, in which the relay transmits a signal
that is independent of the source message in order to confuse the eavesdropper and
hence improve the achievable secrecy rate. Whereas the second type of cooperation
is active cooperation in which a relay listens to the source transmissions and uses its
observation to improve the achievable secrecy rate. This type is based on the well-
known strategies, e.g., decode-and-forward (DF), compress-and-forward (CF), and
amplify-and-forward (AF) strategies, devised originally for cooperative models with
no secrecy constraint. Reference [38] was the first to introduce the basic relay channel
without secrecy constraints where most of these strategies were first proposed (see
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also [44]). In [29], the basic relay-eavesdropper channel was introduced and achievable
secrecy rates were obtained based on extended versions of these strategies as well as
new strategies that fit the secrecy model.
The role of active cooperation of beamforming relays in improving secrecy was
investigated in [39] and [43]. In both [39] and [43], a two-stage cooperative secrecy
protocol is proposed in which a set of multiple relays decode the source’s message in
the first stage, then the relays forward the source’s message to the destination using
beamforming. Reference [39] proposes an iterative strategy, when the global channel
state information (CSI) is perfectly available, to design the beamforming coefficients
either to maximize the secrecy rate for a fixed transmit power or to minimize the
transmit power for a fixed secrecy rate. The same reference proposes a suboptimal
zero-forcing strategy in which an additional constraint of canceling out the signals
from the eavesdropper’s observation is enforced. In [43], the problem of maximizing
the secrecy rate achieved by the collaborative beamforming of the relays when the
global CSI is perfectly available is investigated under both total and individual relay
power constraints where a closed-form solution is obtained in the first case and a
numerical solution is devised for the second case. The work in [39] and [43] appears
to be closely related to the beamforming strategy presented in this chapter. However,
there is a major difference between their model and the model presented here. In
particular, both [39] and [43] assume that the communication occurs in two stages
where in the first stage (source to relays) both the destination and the eavesdropper
cannot hear the source at all and hence no secrecy requirement is involved in this
stage whereas in the second stage only the relays (but not the source) sends the
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source’s message by beamforming to the destination and hence their model becomes
similar to a MISO wiretap channel [16], [10], [15], [42]. This assumption is not made
in the work presented here. In particular, any node in the system can hear any other
transmitting node(s) at any time during the message is being communicated.
In this chapter, we study the DF scheme in the secrecy context and propose DF-
based strategies for secrecy in multiple relay networks. First, we consider the single
relay problem. The problem of maximizing the achievable secrecy rate under individ-
ual average power constraints at the source and the relay is, in general, analytically
intractable. Hence, we propose a suboptimal DF with zero-forcing (DF/ZF) strategy
for which we obtain the optimal power control policy. Next, we consider the multiple
relay problem. We propose three different strategies based on DF/ZF. In the first
strategy, all the relays decode the source message at the same time, then perform
beamforming by transmitting scaled versions of the same signal to the destination,
i.e., in this strategy each message block is transmitted to the destination in a single
hop1, i.e., all the relays decode the same message block at the same time and for-
ward it to the destination. We give the achievable rate using this strategy and derive
the optimal power control policy for both the source and the relays. Although this
strategy is simple, it has an obvious drawback. In particular, we show that in this
strategy the relays which are far from the source could possibly create a bottleneck
that limits the achievable rate.
To overcome this drawback, we propose another strategy that is based on the
1Here, we define the number of hops as the number of transmission blocks required for all the
relays to decode a single block of the source’s message.
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one proposed in [40] (see also [41]) for the case with no secrecy constraints. In this
strategy, the transmission of each message block occurs in a number of hops that is
equal to the number of relays. More precisely, the relays are ordered with respect
to their distance from the source and they perform DF in a multi-hop fashion, i.e.,
the closest relay decodes the source message first, forwards it (with the help of the
source) to the second closest relay and so forth till it reaches the destination. Since
the encoding of the source message is done using block-Markov encoding in which the
source message is divided into a sufficiently large number of blocks, the total overhead
required per block becomes negligible. We show that this strategy overcomes the
bottleneck drawback of the first strategy. In order to really see gains in the secrecy
rate achievable by this strategy, we need to allocate power appropriately at all the
relays. On the other hand, the optimal power allocation policy for the achievable
rate by this strategy is analytically intractable and using numerical methods is not
a practical option especially when the number of relays is large. Hence, a zero-
forcing technique becomes a viable practical alternative since it guarantees that no
information would leak from the relays to the eavesdropper no matter how the relays
allocate their power. We discuss the zero-forcing technique in the second strategy
and show that if all the relays transmit fresh information in every transmission block
then only half of the signal components from different relays can be forced to zero in
the eavesdropper’s observation. We give the achievable secrecy rate in this case.
Although the second strategy overcomes the bottleneck drawback of the first strat-
egy, as the optimal power allocation is not known, the inability to zero-force all the
relays’ signals at the eavesdropper may lead sometimes to a significant reduction in
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the achievable secrecy rate. We observe that to achieve full zero-forcing in the sec-
ond strategy, we need to set half of the relays’ signal components (that represent the
fresh information transmitted by these relays in a given transmission block) to zero.
However, this is not meaningful in a T -hop strategy. Based on this observation, we
propose a T
2
-hop strategy that, in the Gaussian case, represents a practical realization
of the second strategy with full zero-forcing and hence it combines the advantages
of the two aforementioned strategies in an efficient way. That is, the achievable rate
is not limited by the worst source-relay channel as in the first strategy, yet we can
eliminate all the relays’ signals from the eavesdropper’s observation. In this strategy,
the transmission of each message block takes place in a number of hops that is equal
to half the number of relays. The relays form clusters of two relays per cluster. The
source transmits the message to the relays in the first cluster which decode the mes-
sage and forward it (with the help of the source) to the relays in the second cluster
which decode it and forward it (with the help of the source and the relays in the
first cluster) to the relays in the third cluster and so on so forth till the message is
forwarded to the destination. The relays in each clusters are not assumed to have
any kind of direct communication among them. We show that by properly adjusting
the signal coefficients at the relays, we can zero-force all the relays’ signals at the
eavesdropper. Hence, in typical situations, the achievable secrecy rate is significantly
improved with respect to the secrecy rates achieved by the first two strategies.
Finally, we give numerical results to compare the performance of the proposed
strategies in terms of the achievable rates when a constant power allocation is used
at all the relays. Our results show that the second (multi-hop) strategy yields higher
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rates than the first (single-hop) strategy when the variation in the distance between
the source and the relays is large whereas the first strategy yields higher rates when
such variation is small, i.e., when the relays are at about the same distance from the
source. Our simulation results also show that in a typical situation where each relay
has a close neighbor relay, the third strategy outperforms the first two strategies.
5.2 Decode-and-Forward with a Single Relay
We consider the Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel consisting of a source (node 0),
a relay (node 1), a destination (node 2), and an eavesdropper (node 3); see Figure 5.1.
Without loss of generality, one can normalize the channel gains from the source and
the relay to the destination by proper scaling of the power constraints at the source
and the relay. Hence, the outputs at the relay, the destination, and the eavesdropper
are, respectively, given by
Y1 = h01X0 +N1 (5.1)
Y2 = X0 +X1 +N2 (5.2)
Y3 = h03X0 + h13X1 +N3 (5.3)
where hk` denotes the complex channel gain from node k to node `, k ∈ {0, 1} and
` ∈ {1, 3}, Xk denotes the channel input at node k ∈ {0, 1}, and N` denotes the
Gaussian noise at node ` ∈ {1, 2, 3} which is circularly symmetric complex Gaussian
random variable with zero mean and unit variance. We assume that all nodes have
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Figure 5.1: A single relay network.
perfect knowledge of all the channel gains. The average power constraints at the
source and the relay are given by
E[|X0|2] , P0 ≤ P̄0, and E[|X1|2] , P1 ≤ P̄1 (5.4)
We confine our attention to the DF scheme which is given in its original setting
without secrecy constraints in [38] and [44] and extended in the secrecy context in [29].
The achievable secrecy rate using the DF scheme RDF for any discrete memoryless
relay-eavesdropper channel given by some conditional distribution p(y1, y2, y3|x0, x1)
and for some input distribution p(x0, x1) is given by (see [29])
RDF = min{I(X0;Y1|X1), I(X0, X1;Y2)} − I(X0, X1;Y3) (5.5)
For the Gaussian channel given by (5.1)-(5.3) above, as proposed in [38] as well as
in [29], we choose X0 and X1 to be circularly symmetric Gaussian random variables
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with zero mean and variances P0 and P1, respectively. Moreover, X0 and X1 are
related as X0 = X̃0+α0X1 where α0 is some complex number to be determined later,
X̃0 is circularly symmetric Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance P̃0,
and X̃0 is independent of X1. Hence, X0 and X1 are arbitrarily correlated and their
covariance depends on the value of α0. Moreover, from the average power constraints
(5.4), we must have
P̃0 + |α0|2P1 ≤ P̄0, and P1 ≤ P̄1 (5.6)












1 + P̃0 + |α0 + 1|2P1
1 + |h03|2P̃0 + |α0h03 + h13|2P1
)}
(5.7)
where α0, P̃0, and P1 must satisfy (5.6). On the other hand, the secrecy capacity of









where for x ∈ R, (x)+ = max (0, x). For the DF strategy to achieve strictly larger
secrecy rate than the secrecy capacity of the original Gaussian wiretap channel CGWT ,
it is clear from (5.7) and (5.8) that we must have |h01| > max{1, |h03|}. In other words,
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a necessary condition for the DF strategy to be useful is to have |h01| > max{1, |h03|}.
The problem of finding the optimal power control policy (including finding the
optimal value of α0) is in general analytically intractable and closed form solution
could not be obtained. However, we present here a suboptimal strategy for which
we analytically derive the optimal power control policy. Here, we can only zero-force
the relay signal X1 but not the independent component of the source signal X̃0. In
particular, we set α0 = α
ZF , −h13
h03
. We denote the achievable rate in this case as














In the following theorem, we give the optimal power control policy (P̃ ?0 , P
?
1 ) that
maximizes RDF/ZF . This theorem is proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 5.1 If |h01| ≤ max{1, |h03|}, then the optimal power control policy that
maximizes RDF/ZF is given by P̃ ?0 = P
?
1 = 0 when |h01| ≤ |h03| whereas by P̃ ?0 =
P̄0, P
?
1 = 0 when |h01| > |h03|. In this case, the DF/ZF strategy (and even the
general DF strategy) becomes useless since the optimal achievable rate is equal to the
secrecy capacity of the original Gaussian wiretap channel without a relay node. On
the other hand, if |h01| > max{1, |h03|}, then the optimal power control policy that
maximizes RDF/ZF is given by the following cases:








, P̄1 ≥ P̄0|αZF |2 , then P̃ ?0 = P̄0, P ?1 = 0.

































, then P̃ ?0 = P̄0, P
?
1 = 0.











, then we have the following subcases:













, then P̃ ?0 = P̄0−|αZF |2P̄1,
















P ?1 = P̄1.














Moreover, in cases 1 and 3 above, the DF/ZF strategy is useless, i.e., it can only
achieve rates as high as the secrecy capacity of the original Gaussian wiretap channel
with no relay, whereas in cases 2 and 4, the DF/ZF strategy achieves a strictly larger
rate than the secrecy capacity of the original Gaussian wiretap channel.
The following corollary is a direct consequence of the above theorem.
Corollary 5.1 If at least one of the following two conditions is true, then the DF/ZF
strategy is useful, i.e., it achieves a higher secrecy rate than the secrecy capacity of
the original Gaussian wiretap channel without a relay:
1. |h01| > |h03| > 1.










5.3 Decode-and-Forward with Multiple Relays
Let T = {1, ..., T} denote the set of relays. Let the source be denoted as node 0, the
destination as node T + 1, and the eavesdropper as node T + 2. The outputs at the
relays, the destination, and the eavesdropper are given by
Yi = h0iX0 +
∑
j∈T \{i}
hjiXj +Ni, i ∈ T (5.10)








where, for i, j ∈ {0, 1, ..., T +2}, hij is the complex channel gain from node i to node
j, Xi is the channel input at node i, and Ni is the complex circularly symmetric zero
mean unit variance Gaussian noise at node i. We assume perfect knowledge of all
channel gains at all the nodes. The average power constraints are given by
E[|X0|2] , P0 ≤ P̄0, and E[|Xi|2] , Pi ≤ P̄r, i ∈ T (5.13)
where we assume that all the relays have equal power constraints for simplicity.
5.3.1 Multiple Relay Single Hop DF (MRSH-DF) Strategy
In this strategy, all the relays decode the source message at a given block at the same
time and forward it to the destination; see Figure 5.2. In the case of the general
discrete memoryless multiple relay channel given by some conditional distribution
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Figure 5.2: Multiple relay single hop strategy.
p(y1, ..., yT+1, yT+2|x0, ..., xT ), the DF scheme of [29] can be extended to obtain an
analogous scheme for the multiple relay case. It is not difficult to see that the achiev-





{I(X0;Yi|Xr)} , I(X0, Xr;YT+1)
}
− I(X0, Xr;YT+2) (5.14)
for some auxiliary random variable Xr where p(xr, x0, ..., xT ) factors as
p(x0|xr)p(xr)
∏T
j=1 p(xj|xr). For the Gaussian channel, our strategy requires that
all the relays perform signal beamforming as they forward the source message to the
destination. In particular, we choose X0 = X̃0 + α0Xr and Xi = αiXr, i ∈ T where
X̃0, Xr are independent circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables
with zero mean and variances P̃0 and Pr, respectively, and α0, αi, i ∈ T are some
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complex numbers. From (5.13), we must have
P̃0 + |α0|2Pr ≤ P̄0, and |αi|2Pr ≤ P̄r, i ∈ T (5.15)















1 + P̃0 + |α0 +
∑
j∈T αj|2Pr





It is clear that a necessary condition for this strategy to be useful is to have
mini∈T |h0,i| > max{1, |h0,T+2|}. Again, finding the optimal values for P̃0, Pr, and
αi, i ∈ T ∪ {0} is analytically intractable. As in the previous section, we propose
a suboptimal strategy in which α0 is chosen to force the term of the eavesdropper’s
observation that depends on Xr to zero. This goal can be attained for any values






































where i? = argmini∈T |h0i|. However, the problem of maximizing (5.17) under the
constraints P̃0 + |αZF |2Pr ≤ P̄0 and |αj|2Pr ≤ P̄r, j ∈ T is still intractable since αZF
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(and hence the first constraint) depends on αj, j ∈ T and is not merely a constant
as in the previous section. Thus, we resort to a suboptimal procedure to obtain a
tractable solution. Specifically, we first find a set of suboptimal beamforming coeffi-
cients αj, j ∈ {T}, then, for this choice of coefficients, we maximize the achievable
rate under the corresponding set of constraints. In particular, we ignore the con-
straint P̃0 + |αZF |2Pr ≤ P̄0, assume P̃0 to be fixed, and find αj, j ∈ T that maximize
(5.17) for every Pr that satisfies the constraints |αj|2Pr ≤ P̄r, j ∈ T . For this set
of coefficients, the problem of maximizing the achievable rate under the resulting set
of constraints is tractable and can be solved in a way similar to that of the previous
section.
Now, we claim that if P̃0 is fixed, then, for every Pr that satisfies |αj|2Pr ≤










, ∀j ∈ T ,
where a∗ denotes the complex conjugate of the complex number a. To see this,

















|. This upper bound can be attained by selecting the phase of αj





, j ∈ T . Hence, we can replace the

































Define β̂ , max{|αj|, j ∈ T }, βj , αjβ̂ , j ∈ T , and Qr , β̂
2Pr. Hence, the objective
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where |βj| ≤ 1, j ∈ T , and Qr ≤ P̄r. Finally, we note that, for every Qr ≤ P̄r, (5.19)
is maximized by choosing |βj| = 1 ∀j ∈ T .

































where P̃0, Pr satisfy
P̃0 + |αZF |2Pr ≤ P̄0, and Pr ≤ P̄r (5.21)












. Indeed from the similarity between (5.20) and
(5.9), we can easily modify Theorem 5.1 to obtain the optimal power control policy
(P̃ ?0 , P
?
r ) that maximizes (5.20) under constraints (5.21). In particular, if |h0i? | ≤
max{1, |h0,T+2|}, then this strategy is useless, i.e., it can achieve at most the secrecy
capacity of the original wiretap channel with no relays. On the other hand, if |h0i? | >
max{1, |h0,T+2|}, then the optimal power control policy that maximizes (5.20) is given
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by the following cases:


















)2 , P̄r ≥ P̄0|αZF |2 , then P̃ ?0 = P̄0,
P ?r = 0.


























































)2 , P̄r <
P̄0
|αZF |2
, then P̃ ?0 = P̄0,
P ?r = 0.


















)2 , P̄r <
P̄0
|αZF |2
, then we have the
following subcases:







































)2 < P̄r ≤ |h0i? |
2−1










































As in Theorem 5.1, cases 1 and 3 above can only achieve rates as high as the secrecy
capacity of the original Gaussian wiretap channel with no relays, whereas in cases 2
and 4, the DF/ZF strategy achieves a strictly larger rate than the secrecy capacity
of the original Gaussian wiretap channel.
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5.3.2 Multiple Relay Multiple Hop DF (MRMH-DF) Strategy
One clear drawback of the above strategy is the requirement that all relays must
decode the source message in a single hop at the same time and thus the furthest
relay from the source creates a bottleneck in the achievable secrecy rate. To overcome
this drawback, we propose another strategy that is based on the multi-hop DF strat-
egy introduced in [40] for the multiple relay model without an eavesdropper. In this
strategy, the relays in T are given a certain order. In any given transmission block b
of the source message, the first relay decodes the current message block and forwards
it (with the help of the source) to the second relay in the transmission block b + 1
which decodes it and then forwards it (with the help of the source and the first relay)
to the third relay in the transmission block b+ 2 and so on so forth till the last relay
decodes the source message block and forwards it (with the help of the source and all
the other relays) to the destination in the transmission block b+T . Hence, the trans-
mission of each message block occurs over T hops before it reaches the destination;
see Figure 5.3. Since the multi-hop transmission is pipelined, we only have an initial
delay (overhead) of T blocks before the first message block reaches the destination,
however no further delay is involved between source message blocks. Under the usual
assumption that the source message is composed of sufficiently large number of blocks
B >> T , the achievable rate loss due to such overhead is negligible. Without loss of
generality, assume that the relays are ordered according to their label in T , i.e., each
relay i ∈ T is the ith relay in the multi-hop order. In the case of the general discrete
memoryless multiple relay channel with external eavesdropper given by some con-
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Figure 5.3: Multiple relay multiple hop strategy.
ditional distribution p(y1, ..., yT+1, yT+2|x0, ..., xT ), the multi-hop DF scheme of [40]
can be extended by applying stochastic encoding at the source and every relay in
the usual manner to obtain an analogous secure scheme for the multiple relay with
an external eavesdropper problem. By noting that the eavesdropper intercepts the
signal transmitted in each of the T hops, it is not difficult to see that the achievable
secrecy rate RDF by such scheme for some input distribution p(x0, ..., xT ) is given by
RDF = min
{
I(X0;Y1|X1, X2, ..., XT ), ..., I(X0, X1, ..., Xi;Yi+1|Xi+1, ..., XT ), ...,
I(X0, X1, ..., XT ;YT+1)
}
− I(X0, X1, ..., XT ;YT+2) (5.22)
For the Gaussian channel (5.10)-(5.12), we choose the channel inputs as follows.
Xi = X̃i + αiXi+1, i = 0, ..., T − 1 and XT = X̃T where all X̃i, i = 0, ..., T are
independent circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean
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an variances P̃i, i = 0, ..., T , respectively, and αi, i = 0, ..., T − 1, are some complex




`=i α`Xj, i = 0, ..., T − 1 and








|α`|2P̃j ≤ P̄i, i ∈ T ∪ {0} (5.23)













































































































1 + P̃0 + |1 + α0|2P̃1 + |1 + α1 + α0α1|2P̃2





1 + |h0,5|2P̃0 + |h15 + h05α0|2P̃1 + |h25 + h15α1 + h05α0α1|2P̃2




Recall that this rate corresponds to the aforementioned ordering of the relays. In
general, there are T ! of such orderings each of which gives a different rate. In this
strategy, we choose to order the relays according to their distances from the source,
i.e., the closer the relay to the source comes first in the multi-hop order. Hence,
without loss of generality, we assume that |h01| ≥ |h02| ≥ ... ≥ |h0T | and hence the
ordering of the relays gives the rate in (5.24). Clearly, a necessary condition for this
DF strategy to be useful (i.e., to give a rate higher than the secrecy capacity of the
original Gaussian wiretap channel) is to have maxi∈T |h0i| > max{1, |h0,T+2|} which
shows that the relays far from the source do not necessarily limit the achievable rate
as in the MRSH-DF strategy.
Clearly, in the Gaussian case, the MRSH-DF strategy is a special case of the
MRMH-DF strategy when all the relays’ independent signal components X̃i, i ∈ T
are set to zero. This makes the MRMH-DF strategy potentially better than the
MRSH-DF strategy in terms of the achievable secrecy rate if appropriate power allo-
cation is used for the source and the relays. On the other hand, finding the optimal
power allocation for the MRMH-DF strategy is analytically intractable and seeking
numerical solution for this problem is not a practical choice especially if the number
of relays is large. Hence, as a viable practical alternative, we may want to have some
guarantees on the information rate leaked to the eavesdropper by zero-forcing the
relays’ signals at the eavesdropper as we did in the MRSH-DF strategy. In this case,
even if the relays used a simple fixed power strategy, we would guarantee that none
of the relays’ signals would leak to the eavesdropper. However, unlike the MRSH-
DF/ZF strategy, here we cannot eliminate all the components of the relays signals
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from the eavesdropper’s observation unless we set some of the relays’ independent
signal components X̃i to zero. More precisely, if P̃i > 0, ∀ i ∈ T , then we can only
eliminate half of the relays’ signals from the eavesdropper’s observation. In contrast,
in the MRSH-DF strategy, we were able to achieve full zero-forcing because all the
relays’ independent signal components X̃i, i ∈ T were zero in that strategy. However
here if we insist that all the relays must transmit fresh information in each block, i.e.,
P̃i > 0, ∀ i ∈ T , then only the signal components from either the odd (or the even)
relays in the multi-hop ordering can be eliminated from the eavesdropper’s observa-
tion but not both. Hence, we obtain a MRMH-DF strategy with partial zero-forcing
(MRMH-PZF). The reason for this is that whenever we want to eliminate the signal
Xi from the eavesdropper’s observation, we adjust the correlation between Xi and
Xi−1 through choosing the proper value for αi−1. However, this will necessarily give
rise to a non-zero coefficient of Xi−1 in the eavesdropper’s observation. For example,
when T = 3, the eavesdropper’s observation Y5 is given by
Y5 =h05X̃0 + (h15 + h05α0)X̃1 + (h25 + (h15 + h05α0)α1) X̃2
+ (h35 + (h25 + (h15 + h05α0)α1)α2) X̃3 +N5 (5.26)
Here, we can either force the coefficients of X̃1 and X̃3 only to zero by setting α0 =
αZF0 , −h15h05 and α2 = α
ZF
2 , −h35h25 , or we can force the coefficient of X̃2 only to zero
by setting α1 = α
ZF
1 , − h25h15+h05α0 where α0 6= α
ZF
0 .
One can choose to force either the odd or the even terms of the relay signals in the
eavesdropper’s observation to zero. In general, one should make the choice such that
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the coefficients with higher channel gains are forced to zero. Without loss of generality,
we force the odd terms to zero by choosing α2i = α
ZF




The rest of the coefficients must be chosen such that the power constraints (5.23) are


























































































Thus, we conclude that in order to achieve full zero-forcing in this strategy, we must
set half of the independent signal components of the relays to zero, e.g., X̃i = 0
(and hence P̃i = 0) for all odd i in T . However, it would be inefficient to use a DF
strategy with T hops where half of the relays transmit the same signals (except for a
scaling factor) that the other half of the relays transmit. Based on this observation,
we propose below a multi-hop DF strategy using T relays but with only T
2
hops
and show that full zero-forcing is possible in this case. Indeed, for the Gaussian
model, the strategy proposed below is a practical realization of the T -hop strategy
discussed here with full zero-forcing, i.e., when half of the relays independent signal
components are set to zero in the T -hop strategy. It is clear now that the first
MRSH-DF strategy represents one extreme case of the MRMH-DF strategy with T
hops where all the relays’ independent signals components X̃i, i ∈ T are set to zero.
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As discussed earlier, this leads to the drawback of having the achievable rate limited
by the furthest relay from the source. On the other hand, the other extreme is to
have a T -hop strategy where we insist that all the relays transmit fresh information
(represented by the independent signals X̃i) in every transmission block. In this
case, although the bottleneck problem is solved, only partial zero-forcing is possible
and without optimal power allocation (which is analytically intractable) there will
be no guarantees on the information rate leaked to the eavesdropper. Hence, we
propose next a multi-hop strategy that sits somewhere in the middle between these
two extremes and provides an efficient and practical compromise where the achievable
rate is not limited by the worst source-relay channel as in the MRSH-DF strategy
but rather limited by the second best source-relay channel and all the relays’ signals
can be fully eliminated from the eavesdropper’s observation.
5.3.3 Multiple Relay Multiple Hop DF with Full Zero-Forcing (MRMH-
DF/FZF) Strategy
First, we discuss the general strategy without imposing the zero-forcing constraint.
Then, in the Gaussian case, we show how to achieve full zero-forcing. In this strategy,
we assume for simplicity that the number of relays T is even. We also take the number
of the message blocks B to be even. The transmission of each message block takes
place in T
2
hops; see Figure 5.4. This is done as follows. In any given transmission
block b of the source message, the closest pair of relays to the source decodes the bth
message block transmitted by the source and forwards it (with the help of the source)
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Figure 5.4: Multiple relay multiple hop strategy.
to the second closest pair of relays in the transmission block b + 1 which decodes
it and then forwards it (with the help of the source and the first pair of relays) to
the third closest pair of relays2 in the transmission block b + 2 and so on so forth
till the furthest pair of relays from the source decodes the bth message block and
forwards it (with the help of the source and all the other relays) to the destination
in the transmission block b + T
2
. As in the previous subsection, since the multi-hop
transmission is pipelined, the overhead is T
2
blocks. Hence, the loss in the achievable
rate due to this overhead since B >> T . According to scenario described above,
let the relays in the ith pair be labeled as 2i − 1 and 2i, 1 ≤ i ≤ T
2
. In the case
of the general discrete memoryless multiple relay channel with external eavesdropper
given by some conditional distribution p(y1, ..., yT+1, yT+2|x0, ..., xT ), by combining the
results of the two previous subsections, it can be shown that the achievable secrecy
2Here, we mean closest to the source.
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I(X0;Yj|X1,2, ..., XT−1,T ), ...,
min
j∈{2i−1,2i}
I(X0, X1,2, ..., X2i−3,2i−2;Yj|X2i−1,2i, ..., XT−1,T ), ...,
I(X0, X1,2, ..., XT−1,T ;YT+1)
}
− I(X0, X1,2, ..., XT−1,T ;YT+2) (5.28)
for some auxiliary random variablesX1,2, ..., XT−1,T where p(x1,2, ..., xT−1,T , x0, x1, ..., xT )




j=1 p(x2j−1|x2j−1,2j)p(x2j|x2j−1,2j). For the Gaussian
channel (5.10)-(5.12), we choose the channel inputs as follows. X0 = X̃0 + α0X1,2,
X1 = X1,2, X2 = β1,2X1,2, X1,2 = X̃1,2 + α1,2X3,4, X3 = X3,4, X4 = β3,4X3,4,
X3,4 = X̃3,4 + α3,4X5,6 and so on so forth, till XT−1 = XT−1,T , XT = βT−1,TXT−1,T ,




cularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean an variances
P̃0 and P̃2i−1,2i, i = 1, ...,
T
2




β2i−1,2i, i = 1, ...,
T
2
are some complex numbers. Equivalently, we have





























X2` = β2`−1,2`X2`−1 (5.31)
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where, whenever i < j, the product
∏i
t=j is set to 1 and the sum
∑i
t=j is set to 0.










|α2j−1,2j|2P̃2i+1,2i+2 ≤ P̄0 (5.32)





















|α2j−1,2j|2P̃2i+1,2i+2 ≤ P̄2` (5.34)




































































































Now, we show that one can adjust the parameters in this strategy to fully eliminate
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all the relays’ signals from the eavesdropper observation and hence obtain a MRMH-
DF strategy with full zero-forcing (MRMH-DF/FZF). First, we observe that the























Let ζ` denote the coefficient of X̃2`−1,2` in (5.36). One can verify that ζ` can be
obtained recursively from ζ`−1 as follows




Thus, by setting β2`−1,2` = −h2`−1,T+2h2`,T+2 , one can eliminate all the relays’ signals from
the eavesdropper observation. The rest of the parameters, i.e., α0, α2`−1,2`, 1 ≤ ` ≤ T2
and the power values P̃0, P̃2`−1,2`, 1 ≤ ` ≤ T2 should then be chosen to maximize the
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First, we consider the single relay DF strategy. We set P̄1 = 10, h01 =
√
2, and
h13 = h12 = h02 = 1. In Figure 5.5, we plot both the achievable secrecy rate R
DF/ZF
by the DF/ZF strategy and the secrecy capacity CGWT of the channel without a relay
as functions of the source total power P̄0. We do this for two cases of the channel gain
h03, namely, h03 =
√
1.2 and h03 =
√
0.8. It is clear that, as Corollary 5.1 suggests,
when h01 > h03 > 1, we have R
DF/ZF > CGWT = 0 for all P̄0. On the other hand,
when h01 > 1 > h03, the DF/ZF strategy becomes useful when P̄0 is large enough.
Next, we consider the multiple relay model with T relays. We devise a simulation
for the following experiment. Consider a two-dimensional coordinate system where
the source (node 0) is located at the origin. The channel gain h`k between any two
nodes ` and k is given by h`k = d
−γ
`k e
jθ`k where d`k is the distance between ` and
k, γ > 1 is the path loss coefficient, and θ`k accounts for independent phase fading
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Figure 5.5: The achievable secrecy rate, RDF/ZF , and the secrecy capacity of the
original wiretap channel, CGWT , versus the source’s total power, P̄0, for two cases of
h03.
and is uniformly and independently distributed over [0, 2π) for all `, k. We choose
d0,T+1 = d0,T+2 = 1 km and take γ = 3. We use a constant power allocation policy
at all the relays where the transmit powers of all the relays are set to P̄r = 10 and
accordingly power is allocated at the source to maximize the achievable rate where
the total average power at the source is set to P̄0 = 50. We consider two scenarios.
In the first scenario, all the T relays are uniformly spread over a disc of radius 0.75
km centered at the source. In the second scenario, all the T relays are at the same
distance of 0.5 km from the source.
In Figure 5.6, we plot the achievable secrecy rate by each of the proposed multiple-
relay strategies, the MRSH-DF/ZF, the MRMH-DF/PZF, and the MRMH-DF/FZF
strategies, for T = 1, ..., 10. Figure 5.6 shows that the MRMH-DF/PZF strategy usu-
ally achieves higher rates than the MRSH-DF/ZF strategy when there is a noticeable
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Figure 5.6: The achievable secrecy rate by the MRSH-DF, the MRMH-DF/PZF, and
the MRMH-DF/FZF strategies versus the number of relays, T , for two cases.
variation in the magnitudes of the channel gains h0,k, k ∈ T between the source and
the relays which is the case captured by the first scenario. However, since in the
MRMH-DF/PZF strategy, we can eliminate only half of the signal terms from the
eavesdropper’s observation, as T increases, the MRMH-DF/PZF strategy becomes
less efficient due to the increase in the number of signal components observed at the
eavesdropper. One can also see that the MRSH-DF/ZF strategy is usually better
than the MRMH-DF/PZF strategy when the amount of variation in the magnitudes
of the channel gains between the source and the relays is small. This is clearly cap-
tured by the second scenario, where all such channel gains have the same magnitude.
On the other hand, one can see the superiority of the rate achieved by the MRMH-
DF/FZF strategy in both of the examples. This indeed is due to the fact that the
MRMH-DF/FZF strategy enjoys the advantages of the two previous strategies with
almost insignificant loss in the achievable rate in the typical situations.
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5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we considered the notion of active cooperation in relay networks with
secrecy constraint. We first studied the decode-and-forward strategy for secrecy in a
single relay network. We proposed a suboptimal decode-and-forward with zero-forcing
(DF/ZF) strategy for which we obtained the optimal power control policy. For the
multiple relay problem, we proposed three different strategies based on decode-and-
forward with zero-forcing. The first strategy is a single hop strategy. We gave the
achievable rate by this strategy. We showed that all the relays’ signals can be elim-
inated at the eavesdropper (full zero-forcing) and derived the optimal power control
policy in this case. We showed that the rate achieved by this strategy suffers from
a bottleneck created by the worst source-relay channel. The second strategy is a
multiple hop strategy that was shown to overcome the drawback of the first strategy,
however, with the disadvantage of enabling partial zero-forcing only assuming that
all the relays are required to transmit fresh information in every transmission block.
In the third strategy which is also a multiple hop strategy, it was shown that full
zero-forcing is possible and the rate achieved does not suffer from the drawback of
the first strategy. Finally, we gave numerical examples to illustrate the performance
of each of the proposed strategies in terms of the achievable rates.
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5.6 Appendix




























Let R̄DF/ZF denote the maximum value of RDF/ZF over the constraint set given by
(5.6) where α0 = α
ZF = −h13
h03
. Recall that the secrecy capacity of the original
Gaussian wiretap channel without a relay CGWT is given by (5.8). First, we observe
that if |h01| ≤ |h03| then the maximum value of RDF/ZF1 is zero and is attained at
P̃0 = 0. Hence, R̄
DF/ZF = 0 ≤ CGWT and in this case, we can set P1 = 0. On the






with equality attained if and only if P̃0 = P̄0 and P1 = 0.
Next, we turn to the case where |h01 > max{1, |h03|}| which will be assumed in
the rest of the proof. One can easily note that R
DF/ZF
1 (which does not depend on
P1) is a strictly increasing function in P̃0 and that for every P̃0, R
DF/ZF
2 is strictly
increasing in P1. However, the behavior of R
DF/ZF
2 as a function of P̃0 for fixed P1
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2 are non-decreasing in P1, then so is R
DF/ZF . Hence,





















1 + P̃0 + |1 + αZF |2P̄1
1 + |h03|2P̃0
)
, if 0 ≤ P̃0 ≤
(





















P̄0 − |αZF |2P̄1
)+ ≤ P̃0 ≤ P̄0 (5.44)










1− |h03|2 − |h03|2|1 + αZF |2P̄1
(
1 + P̃0 + |1 + αZF |2P̄1
)(
1 + |h03|2P̃0
) , 0 ≤ P̃0 ≤
(








1− |1 + 1
αZF
|2 − |h03|2 − |h03|2|1 + 1αZF |2P̄0
(













P̄0 − |αZF |2P̄1
)+ ≤ P̃0 ≤ P̄0
(5.46)
This leads to the four cases in Theorem 5.1 which we will prove below.








are given by (5.44) and (5.46), respectively. The first





≥ 0. Thus, both RDF/ZF1 and RDF/ZF2
are increasing in P̃0 and hence R̄
DF/ZF is attained at P̃0 = P̃
?
0 = P̄0 which, by
(5.42), implies that P ?1 = 0. Moreover, in this case, it is clear that at the optimal




• Case (2): Similar to case (1), the second condition of this case implies that




are given by (5.44) and (5.46),








1 is strictly increasing in P̃0 whereas R
DF/ZF
2 is strictly decreasing
in P̃0. Therefore, R̄



















note that at P̃0 = P̄0, we have R
DF/ZF
2 = C




2 is strictly decreasing in P̃0 implies that R̄
DF/ZF is strictly larger
than CGWT .





0 for all 0 ≤ P̃0 ≤ P̄0. Hence, both RDF/ZF1 and RDF/ZF2 are increasing in P̃0.
Thus, P̃ ?0 , P
?
1 , and R̄
DF/ZF are the same as in case (1).
• Case (4):










< 0 whenever P̄0 −
|αZF |2P̄1 < P̃0 ≤ P̄0. This implies that RDF/ZF2 attains its local maximum
at P̃0 = P̄0 − |αZF |2P̄1. Moreover, in this case, RDF/ZF2 < RDF/ZF1 at
P̃0 = P̄0 − |αZF |2P̄1. Hence, R̄DF/ZF is attained at P̃ ?0 = P̄0 − |αZF |2P̄1
and at such point R
DF/ZF
2 = R̄
DF/ZF . Since R
DF/ZF
2 is strictly decreasing
in P̃0 for P̄0 − |αZF |2P̄1 < P̃0 ≤ P̄0 and since RDF/ZF2 = CGWT at P̃0 = P̄0,
then we must have R̄DF/ZF > CGWT .






for all 0 ≤ P̃0 ≤ P̄0. It follows that the optimal power value P̃ ?0 is ob-









2 happens when R
DF/ZF




P̄1. It follows from (5.42) that P
?
1 = P̄1. At the optimal
power values, we have R
DF/ZF
2 = R̄
DF/ZF . This together with the fact
that R
DF/ZF
2 is strictly decreasing in P̃0 for 0 ≤ P̃0 ≤ P̄0 and the fact that
at P̃0 = P̄0, we have R
DF/ZF
2 = C
GWT , it follows that R̄DF/ZF > CGWT .
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– Case (4-c): In this case, one can easily verify that R
DF/ZF
2 is strictly de-
creasing in P̃0 for P̄0 − |αZF |2P̄1 < P̃0 ≤ P̄0 and that RDF/ZF1 = RDF/ZF2
happens when R
DF/ZF





2 is greater than or equal to P̄0 − |αZF |2P̄1. Hence, this
value of P̃0 must be the optimal power value P̃
?
0 . As in case (2), this op-








P̄0 which, by (5.42), implies
that P ?1 =
P̄0−P̃ ?0
|αZF |2
. Again, like in cases (2),(4-a), and (4-b), one can show




In this dissertation, we studied two important notions related to physical-layer se-
curity in wireless multi-user channels, namely, alignment and cooperation. Studying
these two notions gives rise to a useful set of tools that exploits the physical properties
of the wireless channel, e.g., its fading and broadcast nature, to achieve and reinforce
information-theoretic security in wireless networks. Towards this end, we studied the
fading multiple access wiretap channel and the cooperative relay channel with secu-
rity constraints and proposed new schemes that efficiently exploit these notions and
apply them in the physical layer to achieve high secure rates over these channels.
For the fading multiple access wiretap channel, we proposed two schemes based on
signal alignment either by using code repetition and signal scaling at the transmitters
(the SBA scheme), or by code repetition over carefully chosen channel uses (the ESA
scheme). We showed that, unlike the schemes based only on i.i.d. Gaussian signaling,
our schemes yield secure rates that scale with the signal-to-noise ratio. In particular,
we showed that, in the K-user fading multiple access wiretap channel, we can achieve
a total of K−1
K
degrees of freedom. We gave an improved version of our second scheme
by incorporating the cooperative jamming technique. We also discussed the optimal
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power control policies for our schemes.
For the cooperative Gaussian relay channel, we investigated the concept of deaf
cooperation to improve the secrecy capacity of the main Gaussian wiretap channel.
We studied two different modes of deaf cooperation, namely, cooperative jamming and
noise forwarding. We obtained the necessary conditions for each of the two modes
to improve over the secrecy capacity of the main wiretap channel. Hence, we showed
that a node cannot be both a useful jammer and a useful noise forwarder at the same
time. We derived the optimal power control policy for each of the two modes. For the
deaf helper selection problem, we proposed a selection strategy in which multiple deaf
helpers operating in different modes are selected to increase the achievable secure rate
of the source. We showed that this selection strategy requires reasonable number of
computations.
We studied the two modes of deaf cooperation when the relay node is equipped
with multiple antennas. We gave two deaf cooperation strategies in which the relay
decomposes his channel to the eavesdropper into two components and it uses the
component orthogonal to the destination’s channel for cooperative jamming while it
uses the component in the direction of the destination’s channel for either cooperative
jamming or noise forwarding. We derived the necessary conditions under which coop-
erative jamming along the direct component is better in terms of the achievable rate
than noise forwarding along the direct component and vice versa. We derived the opti-
mal power control policy in each case. For the reversely degraded relay-eavesdropper
channel, we showed that, by using a simple strategy in which the relay jams with
full power along the orthogonal component, we approach the secrecy capacity of this
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channel as we increase the relay’s power.
Finally, we considered active cooperation in relay networks with security con-
straints. We focused on the decode-and-forward scheme for active cooperation. For
the single relay problem, we proposed a zero-forcing strategy in which the relay sig-
nal is eliminated from the eavesdropper’s observation. We derived the optimal power
allocation policy for this strategy. For the multiple relay problem, we proposed three
decode-and-forward based strategies. For the first strategy, which is a single hop
strategy, we showed that full zero-forcing is possible, however, the rate achievable by
this strategy suffers from a bottleneck caused by the worst source-relay channel. We
showed that the second strategy, which is a multiple hop strategy, overcomes this
drawback, however, only partial zero-forcing is possible. The third strategy, which is
also a multiple hop strategy, was shown to be a good compromise since the achievable
rate is not limited by the worst source-relay channel and full zero-forcing is possible.
Our results not only serve a theoretical purpose by showing that we can provide
and improve security from the physical layer using the techniques of alignment and
cooperation but also serve a practical purpose by studying the practical aspects of the
proposed schemes and the practical considerations that should be taken into account
when these schemes are implemented in a wireless communication system. However,
throughout this dissertation, we made a standard assumption that is usually made in
the related work in this area. Namely, we assumed that the global channel state infor-
mation including the eavesdropper’s channel state information is available at all the
nodes in a causal fashion. Providing security when nothing is known about the eaves-
dropper’s channel state information is a challenging task especially in scalar channels.
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